Reflections on Brady v. Maryland by Gershman, Bennett L.
Pace University
DigitalCommons@Pace
Pace Law Faculty Publications School of Law
2006
Reflections on Brady v. Maryland
Bennett L. Gershman
Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University, bgershman@law.pace.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. Tex. L. Rev. 685 (2006), http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/
180/.
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 685 
11. BRADY THEN AND NOW ............................................................. 692 
A. "Suppression" ........................................................................ 694 
B. "By the Prosecution" ............................................................ 699 
C. "Of Evidence" ....................................................................... 700 
D. "Favorable to an Accused" .................................................. 703 
E. "Upon Request" .................................................................... 704 
F. "Material Either to Guilt or Punishment" .......................... 706 
G .  "Irrespective of the Good Faith or Bad Faith of the 
Prosecution " .. .. .. .... .. . .. . . .. . . . .. . . . . . ... . ... . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 0 7  
111. DISSOLUTION OF THE "BRADY RULE" ..................................... 708 
A. Erosion of Brady by the Judiciary ...................................... 708 
B. Subversion of Brady by Prosecutors ............................. 715 
I .  "Playing the Odds" ......................................................... 715 
2. Sandbagging Tactics ....................................................... 719 
3. Coaching Testimony ....................................................... 721 
C. Marginalizing ofBrady by Disciplinary Bodies ................ 722 
IV. CODIFYING BRADY ..................................................................... 725 
V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 727 
Brady v. Maryland' has reached a respectable age. Not as 
venerated, perhaps, as Gideon v. W a i n ~ r i ~ h t , ~  the famous "right to 
counsel" case also decided that Term, Brady nonetheless occupies a 
special place in the constellation of Supreme Court decisions 
protecting a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial.3 Brady's holding 
is familiar to virtually every practitioner of criminal law: "[Tlhe 
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused 
* Professor of Law, Pace Law School. The author would like to thank the South 
Texas Law Review for organizing the Prosecutorial Ethics Symposium and assisting in the 
presentation and publication of this Article. 
1. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
2. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
3. See Scott E .  Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages: The Tale of 
Brady v. Maryland, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 643,643 (2002) (describing Brady as one of a 
"handful of Warren Court cases [that] have taken on superhero status"). 
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upon request violates due process where the evidence is material 
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad 
faith of the prosecution."4 
This principle, according to the Brady Court, reflects our nation's 
abiding commitment to adversarial justice and fair play toward those 
persons accused of crimes.' As the Court observed: "Society wins not 
only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; 
our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is 
treated unfairly."6 Indeed, by explicitly commanding prosecutors to 
disclose to defendants facing a criminal trial any favorable evidence 
that is material to their guilt or punishment, Brady launched the 
modern development of constitutional disclosure requirements.' 
Reflecting on this landmark decision forty-three years later, one 
is struck by the dissonance between Brady's grand expectations to 
civilize U.S. criminal justice and the grim reality of its largely 
unfulfilled promise. That the so-called "Brady rule" has influenced in 
varying degrees the conduct of U.S. prosecutors is undoubtedly true. 
More than any other rule of criminal procedure, Brady has 
illuminated the prosecutor's constitutional and ethical obligations to 
ensure that defendants receive fair trials, as well as warning 
prosecutors of the consequences of violating the rule. Thousands of 
decisions by federal and state courts have reviewed instances of 
serious Brady violations, and hundreds of convictions have been 
reversed because of the prosecutor's suppression of exculpatory 
evidence.' Reinforcing this judicial oversight, prosecutors have been 
cautioned by their peers to learn and to conscientiously follow the 
constitutional requirements of Brady: and prosecutors' offices have 
4. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Brady built its holding principally on several earlier Supreme Court and circuit 
court decisions dealing with the prosecutor's use of perjured testimony, and in a few cases 
with the prosecutor's suppression of exculpatory evidence. See infra notes 3 5 4  and 
accompanying text. 
8. See JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL 
CASES, 1973-1995, at  5 (2000) (noting that prosecutorial suppression of evidence 
accounted for sixteen percent to nineteen percent of reversible errors); Hugo Adam Bedau 
& Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. 
REV. 21, 23-24, 57 (1987) (asserting that thirty-five of 350 wrongful convictions resulted 
from prosecutorial suppression of evidence); Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, The 
Verdict Dishonor, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 1999, at 3 (reporting that convictions in 381 
homicide cases nationwide have been reversed because prosecutors concealed evidence 
proving the defendant's innocence or presented evidence they knew to be false). 
9. See NAT'L COLL. OF DIST. AlTORNEYS, DOING JUSTICE: A PROSECUTOR'S 
GUIDE TO ETHICS AND CIVIL LIABILITY 36 (Ronald H. Clark ed., 2002) (stating that "a 
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formulated guidelines to foster compliance with the requirements of 
~ r a d ~ . "  Finally, and more explicitly than any other constitutional 
procedural guarantee, Brady's due process standard has been 
incorporated into an explicit ethical duty upon government 
attorneys." 
Nevertheless, despite reversals, guidelines, ethical oversight, and 
hortatory appeals to prosecutors to seek justice, Brady's promise of 
transforming criminal trials from a "sporting" theory of litigation into 
a genuine search for the truth has largely been unkept. Indeed, by 
exposing the seamy, secretive, and cavalier disregard by prosecutors 
of the rights of criminal defendants, Brady has engendered 
widespread cynicism about the capacity of prosecutors to comply with 
their constitutional and ethical obligations, as well as the willingness 
of courts and disciplinary agencies to hold prosecutors accountable for 
their derelictions. Brady, one may correctly conclude, is "[m]ore 
honored in the breach than the observance."" 
Brady has failed as a discovery doctrine.13 Brady is insufficiently 
enforced when violations are discovered, and virtually unenforceable 
when violations are hidden. Because Brady applies to evidence known 
only to the prosecutor and unknown to the defense, disclosure of this 
evidence depends almost exclusively on the diligence, integrity, and 
good faith of the prosecutor. If the prosecutor chooses to conceal 
prosecutor's Brady duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to a criminal defendant is an 
important component of the prosecution function and every prosecutor should undertake 
to  know and conscientiously follow the prosecutor's duties under Brady"). 
10. See, e.g., LOS ANGELES COUNTY DIST. AlTORNEY'S OFFICE, SPECIAL 
DIRECTIVE 02-08, BRADY PROTOCOL (2002), available at http://da.co.la.ca.us/sd02-08.htm 
(establishing the "Brady Compliance Division" to  coordinate and make available known 
Brady information, including preparation and completion of "Brady Forms" describing the 
search required to be conducted by law enforcement personnel to determine the existence 
of Brady material); see also Steve Weinberg, Breaking the Rules: Who Suffers When a 
Prosecutor is Cited for Misconduct, THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, June 26,2003, 
http://www.publicintegrity.or~pmldefault.aspx?sid=main (describing San Diego County 
District Attorney's implementation of a training program and comprehensive manual to 
enforce Brady obligations). 
11. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2004); MODEL CODE OF 
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(B) (2004); ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE 
ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3-3.11(a) (1992), reprinted in PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, RULES & REGULATIONS 1146 (John S. Dzienkowski ed., 
West Group 2001). 
12. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET PRINCE OF DENMARK act 
1,  sc. 4. 
13. See Sundby, supra note 3, at 645 (noting that "if we do not expressly recognize 
Brady's limitations as a discovery doctrine, we may erroneously be tempted to dismiss or 
downplay complaints that discovery rules are inadequate because of a misguided belief 
that Brady ultimately will ensure that nothing important slips through"). 
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exculpatory evidence, the evidence usually will remain hidden until 
long after the defendant is convicted, and in fact may never be 
discovered.14 The extent to which prosecutors fail to discharge their 
Brady obligations therefore is almost impossible to measure 
accurately. 
Nevertheless, by extrapolating from judicial decisions, disclosures 
by the media, and anecdotal evidence, it is readily apparent that 
Brady violations are among the most pervasive and recurring types of 
prosecutorial violations. Indeed, Brady may be the paradigmatic 
example of prosecutorial misconduct. Numerous studies have 
documented widespread and egregious Brady  violation^.'^ Many of 
these violations have occurred in the same prosecutors' office,16 and 
appear to have occurred disproportionately in capital cases." And 
most tragically, Brady violations have not infrequently contributed to 
the convictions of innocent persons who, because of the prosecutor's 
suppression, lacked critical evidence to prove their innocence.'' 
14. United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1310 (3d Cir. 1984) ("[Wle are left with 
the nagging concern that material favorable to the defense may never emerge from secret 
government files."), vacated sub nom. United States v. Plfaumer, 473 U.S. 922 (1985) 
(mem.). 
15. See sources cited supra note 8. 
16. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It is Time to Take Prosecution 
Discipline Seriously, 8 UDCIDCSL L. REV. 275, 28142 (2004) (noting seventy-two 
reported cases of prosecutorial misconduct from the Bronx District Attorney's office 
between 1975-1996, eighteen of which involved reversals of convictions based on 
prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evidence); see also Weinberg, supra note 10. The 
Center for Public Integrity analyzed post-1970 cases involving prosecutorial misconduct 
and found that, in many instances, misconduct occurred in the same office and often by the 
same prosecutor. Id. 
17. Most of the post-Brady decisions by the United States Supreme Court addressing 
the nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence occurred in capital cases. See infra notes 214-19 
and accompanying text. 
18. See, e.g., Brown v. Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457, 1466 (11th Cir. 1986); Carter v. 
Rafferty, 621 F. Supp. 533, 548 (D.N.J. 1985), affd in part, 826 F.2d 1299 (3d Cir. 1987); 
People v. Ramos, 614 N.Y.S.2d 977, 984 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); People v. Jackson, 538 
N.Y.S.2d 677, 679 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988); Pierce v. State, 786 P.2d 1255, 1261 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 1990); Ex parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281,291 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). These cases are 
almost certainly only a tiny fraction of the total number of cases in which defendants have 
been falsely convicted due in large part to  a prosecutor's misconduct, especially 
misconduct involving the willful suppression of exculpatory evidence or subornation of 
perjury. See JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE 172-82 (Doubleday 2000) 
(recounting several cases in which a prosecutor's misconduct resulted in the conviction and 
incarceration of an innocent person); Samuel R. Gross et  a]., Exonerations in the United 
States, 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 524, 533-34, 539 (2005) 
(locating 340 exonerations from 1989-2003, not counting hundreds of additional 
exonerated defendants in Tulia and Ramparts scandals and other mass exonerations of 
more than seventy convicted childcare sex abuse defendants); see also Daniel S. Medwed, 
The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. 
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Abetting the prosecutor's misconduct is the failure of the 
judiciary to adequately enforce Brady's constitutional command and 
thereby protect a defendant's right to due process. Even in those 
infrequent instances when a prosecutor's suppression of evidence is 
discovered, the judiciary's enforcement of Brady has been 
inconsistent, confusing, and increasingly deferential to the 
prosecutor's discretion. Whereas the courts continue to recognize and 
articulate the broad components of the Brady rule, the so-called 
"rule" has undergone considerable judicial alteration over the years so 
that its original formulation is largely unrecognizable. To be sure, a 
few of these changes have added modest increments that theoretically 
benefit criminal defendants, such as abolishing the need for a 
defendant to make a specific request for "Brady" evidencelg and 
applying Brady's coverage equally to exculpatory and impeachment 
evidence." 
However, as courts and commentators consistently have 
recognized, the most far-reaching modification of Brady has been the 
judiciary's interpretation of the concept of "materiality," and the 
resulting prosecutorial "game~manship."~' Whereas Brady used the 
term "materiality" prospectively to identify evidence that a prosecutor 
is required to disclose to a defendant to protect his right to a fair 
trial: the judiciary's current approach defines materiality 
retrospectively to identify evidence that a prosecutor should have 
disclosed to the defendant, and whether the prosecutor's 
nondisclosure was so prejudicial that it denied the defendant a fair 
trial.= The most pernicious consequence of the judiciary's radical 
reconstruction of the concept of materiality has been to afford 
prosecutors an extraordinarily wide berth to conceal favorable 
evidence from the defense in the completely rational expectation that 
REV. 125, 132-69 (2004) (analyzing institutional and political barriers deterring 
prosecutors from accepting the potential legitimacy of post-conviction claims of 
innocence). 
19. See infra notes 134-46 and accompanying text. 
20. See infra notes 105-17 and accompanying text. 
21. United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298,1310 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting the "annoying 
frequency [of] gamesmanship by some prosecutors" is attributable to the "prosecutor's 
tendency to adopt a retrospective view of materiality"), vacated sub nom. United States v. 
Plfaumer, 473 U.S. 922 (1985) (mem.). 
22. See United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132,141 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[Brady] appears to 
be using the word 'material' in its evidentiary sense, i.e., evidence that has some probative 
tendency to preclude a finding of guilt or lessen punishment."). 
23. Id. at 140 ("[Tlhe scope of a defendant's constitutional right-is ultimately 
defined retrospectively, by reference to the likely effect that the suppression of particular 
evidence had on the outcome of the trial."); see infra notes 147-55 and accompanying text. 
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the suppression either will not be discovered or, if discovered, will be 
found by a reviewing court to not be material.24 And given this 
retrospective, ad hoc, fact-intensive, and wholly speculative factual 
and doctrinal analysis required to determine the "materiality" of 
suppressed evidence, it is increasingly likely that even in egregious 
instances of nondisclosure, a court will find the suppression to be not 
material.25 Prosecutors are thereby encouraged to "play the odds," and 
are almost totally insulated from meaningful judicial s~pervision.'~ 
24. See infra notes 147-55 and accompanying text. Compare Oxman, 740 F.2d at 1314 
("What we can no longer tolerate is the prosecutor's guess before trial that the evidence 
after trial will not prove to  have been material, and the consequent decision to conceal it 
even from the trial court."), with Coppa, 267 F.3d at  143 ("The prosecutor, however, 
cannot await the outcome and must therefore make a prediction before the trial as to how 
the nondisclosure of favorable evidence will be viewed after the trial."). 
That prosecutors view their disclosure obligation extremely narrowly is confirmed 
by anecdotal evidence. For example, Judge Jon Newman of the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals, when he was a United States Attorney, posed to a large audience of prosecutors a 
hypothetical bank robbery in which the defendant was identified by two or three tellers 
and one or two customers. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,697 (1985) (Marshall, 
J., dissenting) (citing Discovery in Criminal Cases, 44 F.R.D. 481, 500-01 (1968)). Another 
customer was located who stated that the defendant was not the perpetrator. Id. Acc~rding 
to Judge Newman, "The question I put to these prosecutors was, do you believe you 
should disclose to the defense the name of the witness who, when he viewed the suspect, 
said 'that is not the man?"' Id. Only two prosecutors felt they should disclose the 
information. Id. "Yet I was putting to them what I thought was the easiest case-the 
clearest case of disclosure of exculpatory information!" Id. 
In a survey of New York State prosecutors conducted by the John Jay Legal 
Clinic of Pace Law School relating to a domestic violence prosecution in which the 
defendant has been charged with assault, aggravated harassment, and menacing, 
prosecutors were asked whether they would disclose to  the defense statements made by a 
hypothetical victim. Sixty-two questionnaires were sent out and thirty-two prosecutors 
offices responded. Prosecutors were asked whether the following statements by the victim 
were Brady evidence that should be disclosed: 
1. "It was all my fault." Twelve prosecutors said it was Brady; twelve said it was not Brady. 
2. "I instigated the whole encounter." Ten said it was Brady; thirteen said it was not Brady. 
3. "I made him hit me." Twelve said it was Brady; twelve said it was not Brady. 
4. "He didn't hurt me." Twenty-three said I was Brady; seven said it was not Brady. 
5. "I hit him too." Fourteen said it was Brady; fourteen said it was not Brady. 
6. "I exaggerated what happened." Eighteen said it was Brady; ten said it was not Brady. 
7. "What's in the police report isn't true." Twenty-three said it was Brady; three said it was 
not Brady. 
JOHN JAY LEGAL CLINIC, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIM STATEMENTS: BRADY OR NOT? 
1-6 (2000). 
25. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 702 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The standard for disclosure 
that the Court articulates today enables prosecutors to avoid disclosing obviously 
exculpatory evidence while acting well within the bounds of their constitutional 
obligation."). 
26. See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITI'. L. REV. 393, 439 
(1992) ("Thus, by avoiding any inquiry into the prosecutor's culpability, and focusing 
entirely on the materiality of the evidence, the Court encourages prosecutors, even ethical 
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Finally, apart from legal accountability, prosecutors are almost 
never disciplined by the legal profession for Brady violations, even in 
the most blatant and easily provable cases.27 Of all the ethical rules 
regulating courtroom conduct by prosecutors, the rule governing a 
prosecutor's obligations under Brady is the most explicit provision 
and the easiest to enforce.28 It is therefore profoundly ironic that, 
given the multitude of instances involving unambiguous and easily 
provable Brady violations, the imposition of professional discipline on 
prosecutors by agencies mandated to enforce ethical rules has been so 
rare.29 As it enters its forty-fourth year, Brady v. Maryland, more than 
any of the other icons of the Warren Court era, has become a 
monument to judicial and ethical impotence. 
Part I of this Article describes the evolution of the Brady rule 
over the past forty-three years. Part I sketches the origins of the rule 
and its doctrinal developments. Part I1 closely examines Brady's 
impact on constitutional criminal procedure. Part I1 suggests that 
Brady's essential goal has been eroded by the courts, subverted by 
prosecutors, and ignored by disciplinary bodies. Part 111 proposes that 
only through expanding a defendant's right to discovery can the goal 
of Brady be realized. The Article concludes that Brady, more than any 
prosecutors, to withhold evidence."). 
27. See Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady 
Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 697 (1987); Armstrong & Possley, supra 
note 8, at 3. 
28. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2004); MODEL CODE OF 
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (2004); ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMIN. 
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3-3.11(a) (1992), reprinted in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
STANDARDS, RULES & REGULATIONS 1146 (John S. Dzienkowski ed., West Group 2001). 
The prosecutor's ethical duty is broader than her constitutional duty. See Kyles v. Whitley, 
514 U.S. 419,437 (1995) (constitutional rule requires less than the ethical rule). Under the 
constitutional rule, a prosecutor is required to disclose only evidence that is materially 
favorable to the defense, whereas the ethical rules require the prosecutor to disclose all 
evidence or information that tends to  "negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the 
offense." Compare id. (describing the constitutional duties), with MODEL RULES OF 
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (stating the relevant ethical rule). Moreover, the ethical rule is 
not limited to admissible evidence; it includes all evidence or information that is favorable 
to the accused, whether or  not it is admissible. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 
3.8(d). Additionally, under the constitutional rule, a prosecutor can avoid a violation for 
nondisclosure if the evidence is cumulative of evidence already disclosed, whereas the 
ethical rule contains no such limitation. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437. Finally, a defendant's 
knowledge of the undisclosed evidence, or  ability with reasonable diligence to acquire such 
evidence, usually relieves the prosecutor of his disclosure obligation, whereas no such 
limitation is contained in the ethical rule. See Lisa M. Kurcias, Note, Prosecutor's Duty to 
Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1205, 1219-20 (2000) (arguing 
against changing the ethics rules to include materiality requirement). 
29. See injia notes 267-78 and accompanying text. 
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other rule of constitutional criminal procedure, has been the most 
fertile and widespread source of misconduct by prosecutors and, more 
than any other rule of constitutional criminal procedure, has exposed 
the deficiencies in the truth-serving function of the criminal trial. 
Brady v. Maryland? in hindsight, is a curious decision, both 
factually and legally. Brady conceded that he participated with an 
accomplice in a gruesome murder, his guilt was proved 
overwhelmingly; the prosecutor's failure to disclose to Brady an 
isolated statement made by his accomplice was arguably inadvertent, 
the statement had no bearing on Brady's guilt, and was of only 
marginal relevance to his p~nishment.~' The Maryland Court of 
Appeals vacated Brady's conviction, however, finding that the 
prosecutor's suppression of the accomplice's statement violated due 
process, but remanded the case for a new trial on the issue of 
punishment only, not on the issue of The federal question in 
the Supreme Court, then, was whether the state court's decision 
limiting Brady's new trial to the issue of only his sentence violated the 
federal con~ti tut ion.~~ The Supreme Court affirmed the Maryland 
judgment, finding that the state court's decision did not violate the 
United States Constitution, but then proceeded to announce a new 
rule of discovery for criminal defendants based on constitutional due 
p r o ~ e s s . ~  
30. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
31. Id. at 84. Brady and his companion, Boblit, were found guilty of capital murder at 
separate trials and sentenced to death. Id. Brady, at his trial, took the stand and admitted 
that he participated in the crime, but claimed that Boblit did the actual killing. Id. Brady's 
lawyer conceded in his summation that Brady was guilty of murder in the f i s t  degree, 
asking only that the jury return a verdict without capital punishment. Id. Prior to trial, 
Brady's lawyer requested the prosecution show him Boblit's extrajudicial statements. Id. 
Several statements were disclosed, but one statement in which Boblit admitted to the 
actual killing, was not revealed. Id. 
32. Id. at 85. The Maryland court found that Boblit's statement would have no 
bearing on Brady's guilt for first degree murder under the law of accomplice liability. Id. at 
88. However, Boblit's statement admitting to being the actual killer might have persuaded 
the jury to  spare Brady's life. Id. at 89. 
33. Id. at 85. The issue of whether the prosecutor's suppression of evidence violated 
due process was neither briefed nor argued. See Brief of Petitioner at 2, Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (No. 490). 
34. Brady, 373 U.S. at 86. Given the limited disposition of the appeal, the due process 
discussion by the Court, in Justice White's view, "is wholly advisory." Id. at 92 (White, J., 
concurring). The dissenting opinion of Justices Harlan and Black contended that the issue 
before the Court was whether the Maryland state court order granting a new trial, limited 
to the issue of punishment, violated Brady's Fourteenth Amendment right to equal 
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The Court's opinion is peculiar.35 The Court suggested that its 
decision in Brady was merely an "extension" of earlier decisions 
concerning a defendant's due process right to a fair However, 
each of those decisions related principally to a prosecutor's deliberate 
use of false testimony at trial to secure the defendant's conviction, 
clearly not the case in ~ r a d ~ . ~ '  In only one of those decisions did the 
Court cite the prosecutor's failure to disclose favorable e~idence.~' 
The Court also cited two decisions from the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Cir~uit,~' both also cited by the Maryland Court 
of Appeals, which, according to the Supreme Court, "state the correct 
constitutional rule.""0 Considered collectively, the unifying theme of 
all these cases is the recognition by the Court of the central role 
played by the prosecutor in ensuring that the accused receives a fair 
trial.41 Indeed, the Supreme Court in Brady described the prosecutor 
protection. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
35. See United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1308 (3d Cir. 1984) (characterizing 
Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court as "unfortunately unanalytical"), vacated sub norn. 
United States v. Plfaumer, 473 U.S. 922 (1985) (mem.). 
36. Brady, 373 U.S. at  86-87. The leading cases cited by the Court are Mooney v. 
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942); Napue v. Illinois, 360 
U.S. 264 (1959); and Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957) (per curiam). The Court also 
added citations to Wilde v. Wyoming, 362 U.S. 607, 607 (1960) (claiming that defendant's 
guilty plea "was induced when he 'had no counsel present' and that the prosecutor willfully 
suppressed the testimony of two eyewitnesses to the alleged crime which would have 
exonerated the petitioner") and Durley v. Mayo, 351 U.S. 277, 287 (1956) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting) (alleging that witnesses lied to curry favor with prosecution). 
37. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 84. The Court also introduced the words, "upon request," 
even though none of the cases cited by the Court turned on the presence or absence of a 
request. Id. at 87; see also Oxman, 740 F.2d at 1309 (Justice Douglas's inclusion of the 
words "upon request" suggested to prosecutors that they had no duty to disclose 
exculpatory evidence in absence of a request.). 
38. See Pyle, 317 U.S. at 214-16 (reviewing a claim that defendant's imprisonment 
"resulted from perjured testimony, knowingly used by the State authorities to obtain his 
conviction, and from the deliberate suppression by those same authorities of evidence 
favorable to him"). 
39. See United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763, 767 (3d Cir. 1955) 
(finding the state failed to  disclose evidence of defendant's intoxicated condition at time of 
arrest, which should have been submitted to the jury); United States ex rel. Almeida v. 
Baldi, 195 F.2d 815, 819-20 (3d Cir. 1952) (finding the state's failure to disclose ballistics 
evidence may have been helpful to defense). 
40. Brady, 373 U.S. at 86. 
41. Id. at 87 (noting that "[slociety wins not only when the guilty are convicted but 
when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any 
accused is treated unfairly"). The Court had previously emphasized the prosecutor's duty 
at trial to avoid committing "foul blows" to win a conviction. See Berger v. United States, 
295 U.S. 78,88 (1935) ("[Wlhile [a prosecutor] may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to 
strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to 
produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just 
one."). In Brady, the Court for the first time articulated the prosecutor's affirmative 
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not merely as the attorney for one of the parties, but as the "architect" 
of the proceeding with the power to "shape a trial that bears heavily 
on the defendant."" Accordingly, under Brady, when a prosecutor 
fails to comply with a defendant's request for evidence that might be 
relevant to proving the defendant's innocence, or mitigating the 
offense or the punishment, the prosecutor violates due process if the 
evidence is material to guilt or p~nishment.~' 
The holding in Brady contains several components, each of which 
raises difficult questions of interpretation." What constitutes 
"suppression" of evidence? What constitutes "favorable" evidence? 
Does the prosecutor have to be aware that she possesses Brady 
evidence? Does Brady apply if the defense already knows about the 
evidence? Does the evidence have to be admissible for Brady to 
apply? What type of "request" by the defense satisfies the Brady 
standard? Is there a distinction in Brady between suppressed evidence 
that exculpates an accused and suppressed evidence that impeaches a 
prosecution witness? What did the Court mean by its requirement 
that the evidence must be "material either to guilt or to punishment"? 
Finally, is a prosecutor's "bad faith" in deliberately suppressing 
favorable and material evidence relevant? The following sections 
attempt to answer these questions by identifying the components of 
the Brady rule and examining how these concepts have been 
interpreted by the courts since Brady. 
A. "Suppression" 
Although Brady did not define the meaning or scope of a 
prosecutor's "suppression" of evidence, the concept has been 
understood by the courts to include several distinct kinds of 
nondisclosures: a prosecutor's concealment from the accused of 
information or evidence that could negate guilt or reduce the crime or 
p~nishment,~' a prosecutor's knowing use of false testimony and the 
failure to reveal such testimony: and a prosecutor's allowing false 
testimony to remain uncorrected when the prosecutor should have 
obligation not simply to avoid misconduct, but to ensure that "justice is done its citizens in 
the courts." 373 U.S. at 87. 
42. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-88. 
43. Id. at 87. 
44. See id. 
45. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 453-54 (1995); Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 
79695 (1972). 
46. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668,701-03 (2004); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28,31- 
32 (1957); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103,112 (1935). 
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known that the testimony is false." The concept of suppression also 
includes a prosecutor's failure to investigate the background of her 
witness and the apparently false testimony given by her witness.@ 
Neither Brady nor its antecedents established a test to determine 
whether a conviction based on a prosecutor's knowing use of false 
testimony must be reversed as a violation of due process. The Court 
subsequently stated the test to be whether "there is any reasonable 
likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment 
of the jury."" Relevant factors in making this assessment include the 
importance of the witness," the significance of his te~timony,~' the 
strength of the government's case,52 and the prosecutor's attempt to 
exploit the false testimony for a tactical a d ~ a n t a g e . ~ ~  
Suppression of information bearing on the falsity of testimony 
typically encompasses perjured testimony by a witness. A prosecutor's 
elicitation, or his failure to correct, a witness's misleading, incomplete, 
or technical misstatements ordinarily is not viewed as a suppression of 
evidence.54 However, a prosecutor suppresses evidence when he 
devises a scheme to shield the witness from knowledge of an 
agreement between the prosecutor and the witness's lawyer and 
thereby allows the witness to give technically truthful, but essentially 
false te~timony.'~ 
A prosecutor does not suppress evidence if the defendant already 
knows about the existence of the evidence.56 A defendant's actual or 
47. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972); People v. Steadman, 623 N.E.2d 
509,512 (N.Y. 1993). 
48. N. Mariana Islands v. Bowie, 243 F.3d 1109,1117 (9th Cir. 2001). 
49. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); see also United States v. Gale, 
314 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("[P]rosecution's knowing use of false testimony entails a 
veritable hair trigger for setting aside the conviction."). 
50. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154-55; Mitchell v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1036, 1062, 1064 (10th 
Cir. 2001). 
51. Jenkins v. Artuz, 294 F.3d 284,297 (2d Cir. 2002); see Fairman v. Anderson, 188 
F.3d 635,646 (5th Cir. 1999). 
52. See Fulford v. Maggio, 692 F.2d 354,357 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Ramos 
Algarin, 584 F.2d 562,565 (1st Cir. 1978). 
53. Jenkins, 294 F.3d at 295; Mitchell, 262 F.3d at 1064-66. 
54. See United States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381, 1395-96 (11th Cir. 1997) (reasoning 
memory lapse, unintentional error, or oversight is not considered false testimony); United 
States v. Payne, 940 F.2d 286,291 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting the fact that testimony challenged 
by another witness or inconsistent with prior statements is not necessarily false testimony). 
55. Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972,981 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc); People v. Steadman, 
623 N.E.2d 509,511 (N.Y. 1993); see also Willhoite v. Vasquez, 921 F.2d 247,251 (9th Cir. 
1990) (Trott, J., concurring) (characterizing the prosecutorial tactic as a "pernicious 
scheme without any redeeming features"); see infra notes 248-58 and accompanying text. 
56. United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 618 (2d Cir. 1982). "Evidence is not 
'suppressed' if the defendant either knew, or should have known, of the essential facts 
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probable knowledge of the evidence may relieve a prosecutor of his 
Brady obligation.'' Although Brady did not discuss whether a 
defendant's knowledge of the evidence negates a claim of suppression, 
the Court later suggested that a prosecutor does not suppress 
evidence under Brady if the defendant already knew about the 
undisclosed evidence.'* Nor, according to several courts, is evidence 
suppressed under Brady if the defendant, with reasonable diligence, 
could have learned about the e~idence.~' However, evidence that 
theoretically may be accessible to the defense does not necessarily 
insulate that evidence from disclosure by the prosecutor. According to 
some courts, to hold a defendant accountable for every conversation 
he has ever had would constitute an undue burden,60 as it would be 
unfair to require a defendant to learn about the existence of all 
documentary evidence bearing on his case.61 
Whether the nondisclosure by a prosecutor of favorable evidence 
during plea negotiations and guilty pleas constitutes suppression 
under Brady is ~nclear.~'  The Supreme Court has held that a 
prosecutor does not suppress evidence under Brady when he fails to 
disclose, during plea negotiations, evidence that a defendant could use 
at trial to impeach a government witness.63 The Court has not decided 
whether a prosecutor suppresses evidence when he fails to disclose to 
a defendant contemplating a guilty plea the existence of exculpatory 
evidence. However, several courts have held that a prosecutor 
suppresses evidence when he conceals exculpatory evidence during 
permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory evidence." Id. (citations omitted). But 
see Banks v. Reynolds, 54 F.3d 1508,1517 (10th Cu. 1995) (recognizing a prosecutor's duty 
to disclose evidence independent of defendant's knowledge). 
57. United States v. Bhutani, 175 F.3d 572, 578 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that even if 
defendant has no actual knowledge of the suppressed information, Brady is not violated if 
defendant, with reasonable diligence, could have obtained such evidence). 
58. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (stating Brady involves "the 
discovery, after trial of information which had been known to the prosecution but 
unknown to  the defense"). 
59. Bhutani, 175 F.3d at 577. 
60. Schledwitz v. United States, 169 F.3d 1003, 1013 (6th Cir. 1999) ("We d o  not 
believe that due process stretches so far as to hold a defendant accountable for every 
conversation he has ever had in his lifetime regardless of the surrounding and intervening 
circumstances."). 
61. United States v. Payne, 63 F.3d 1200,1209 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting the defense had 
no reason to know that government witness's affidavit had been filed in court prior to her 
guilty plea). 
62. See Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 
HASTINGS L.J. 957, 958 (1989) (noting that although Brady issues frequently are raised in 
the plea bargaining process, the extent of a prosecutor's duty t o  disclose exculpatory 
evidence during plea negotiations is unclear). 
63. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622,623 (2002). 
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plea negotiations.64 Moreover, a prosecutor may be found to have 
suppressed evidence when he fails to disclose, during plea 
negotiations, relevant information relating to the plea, such as the 
existence of other ongoing investigations involving the defendant.65 
A prosecutor also may suppress evidence under Brady when he 
fails to preserve favorable evidence from loss or dest r~ct ion.~~ 
Otherwise, some courts have observed, the disclosure obligation could 
easily be circumvented by suppression of evidence by means of 
destruction rather than mere failure to disclose. Common examples of 
unpreserved evidence include 911 tapes: handwritten notes of 
interviews with witnesses: erased videotapes relevant to the crime,69 
discarded samples used in chemical tests,70 lost blood, sperm, hair, or 
urine  sample^,^' and unpreserved clothing worn by the defendant or 
the victim.72 Although Brady explicitly stated that a prosecutor's bad 
faith in suppressing evidence was not a relevant c~nsideration,'~ the 
failure by prosecutors or police to preserve potentially exculpatory 
evidence from loss or destruction is not a due process violation unless 
64. See United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249,255 (2d Cir. 1998); Sanchez v. United 
States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1453-54 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Wright, 43 F.3d 491, 495-96 
(10th Cir. 1994); White v. United States, 858 F.2d 416, 421-22 (8th Cir. 1988); see also 
Corinna Barrett Lain, Accuracy Where it Matters: Brady v. Maryland in the Plea Bargaining 
Context, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 21 (2002) (arguing that Brady's role in protecting the 
innocent from wrongful conviction is just as essential in the plea bargaining context as it is 
at trial); Andrew P. O'Brien, Reconcilable Differences: The Supreme Court Should Allow 
the Marriage of Brady and Plea Bargaining, 78 IND. L.J. 899, 911 (2003) (obligating 
prosecutors to disclose material exculpatory evidence during plea negotiations would 
ensure better informed and more accurate guilty pleas). But see John G. Douglass, Fatal 
Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 516 
(2001) (concluding that plea bargaining "brings out the worst in Brady"). 
65. See United States v. Krasn, 614 F.2d 1229,1234 (9th Cir. 1980). 
66. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57-58 (1988) (finding a due process 
violation only if a defendant can show that failure to preserve the evidence was in bad 
faith); see also Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 545 (2004) (per curiam). State courts need 
not apply Youngblood's bad faith test. See State v. Morales, 657 A.2d 585, 589 (Conn. 
1995); People v. Newberry, 638 NiE.2d 1196, 1199 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994), a r d ,  652 N.E.2d 
288 (111.1995). 
67. People v. Brock, 740 N.Y.S.2d 54,55 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002). 
68. United States v. Riley, 189 F.3d 802,804-05 (9th Cir. 1999). 
69. United States v. Parker, 72 F.3d 1444,1451 (10th Cir. 1995). 
70. California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479,482-83 (1984). 
71. United States v. Boswell, 270 F.3d 1200, 1206 (8th Cir. 2001); Virgin Islands v. 
Testamark, 570 F.2d 1162, 1167 (3d Cir. 1978); People v. Allgood, 517 N.E.2d 1316, 1317 
(N.Y. 1987); Ex parte Brandley, 781 S.W.2d 886,894 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc). 
72. State v. Matafeo, 787 P.2d 671, 672 (Haw. 1990); People v. Walker, 628 N.E.2d 
971,973 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). 
73. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,87 (1963). 
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the defendant can establish the government's bad faith." 
Finally, suppressed evidence may also include evidence disclosed 
by the prosecutor too late for effective use by the defendant at 
Brady did not address the issue of when a prosecutor is required to 
disclose favorable evidence, nor has the Supreme Court since Brady 
answered that question. Whereas a demand for Brady evidence 
ordinarily is made prior to trial, the prosecutor's disclosure duty does 
not necessarily require pretrial discl~sure.~~ The settled rule seems to 
be that Brady evidence must be disclosed in time for its effective use 
at or at a plea proceeding.78 The ethics codes similarly require 
"timely disclosure," but do not explicitly require pretrial d isc l~sure .~~ 
Delayed disclosure ordinarily is reviewed to determine whether 
the defendant had a meaningful opportunity to make effective use of 
the evidence at trial.'" Courts may also review a prosecutor's untimely 
disclosure to determine whether a defendant's ability to adequately 
prepare for trial was impaired." Thus, to successfully claim that a 
prosecutor's belated disclosure constituted a "suppression" of 
evidence, a defendant must demonstrate an impaired ability to use the 
evidence effectively, either in preparing for trial or at the trial itself, 
and that prejudice resulted from the belated disclo~ure.~~ Defense 
counsel's failure to request a continuance after belatedly receiving the 
evidence would be a circumstance negating prosecutorial 
suppression.83 The prosecutor's good or bad faith in delaying the 
disclosure also may be a relevant circ~mstance.~~ In those relatively 
74. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51,58 ("[Ulnless a criminal defendant can show 
bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not 
constitute a denial of due process of law."). 
75. Leka v. Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89,100 (2d Cir. 2001). 
76. United States ex rel. Lucas v. Regan, 503 F.2d 1,3 n.1 (2d Cir. 1974). 
77. United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that evidence 
"must be disclosed in time for its effective use at trial"). 
78. United States v. Persico, 164 F.3d 796,804 (2d Cir. 1999). 
79. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2004) (requiring prosecutor to 
make "timely disclosure"); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(B) 
(2004) (same); ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3- 
3.11(a) (1992), reprinted in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, RULES & 
REGULATIONS 1146 (John S. Dzienkowski ed., West Group 2001). (requiring prosecutor 
to disclose evidence "at the earliest feasible opportunity"). 
80. Madsen v. Dormire, 137 F.3d 602,605 (8th Cir. 1998). 
81. Leka v. Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89,103 (2d Cir. 2001). 
82. Grant v. Alldredge, 498 F.2d 376,381 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding belated disclosure of 
identification evidence impaired defense counsel's ability to uncover additional 
exculpatory evidence). 
83. United States v. Watson, 76 F.3d 4,8 (1st Cir. 1996). 
84. See United  states.^. Richman, 600 F.2d 286, 292 (1st Cir. 1979) (finding no 
deliberate wrongdoing in late disclosure); see also United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 
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infrequent cases in which a defendant can demonstrate that delayed 
disclosure prejudiced his ability to prepare for trial or to present his 
case meaningfully and effectively, a prosecutor may be found to have 
unconstitutionally suppressed e~idence.~' 
B. "By the Prosecution" 
In Brady, the prosecutor had actual knowledge of a statement of 
Brady's accomplice that might have mitigated Brady's punishment 
and failed to disclose it to the defense.86 The Supreme Court did not 
consider whether a due process violation required a prosecutor to 
have actual knowledge of the undisclosed evidence and make a 
purposeful decision to suppress the evidence. In other words, could 
suppression by a prosecutor be established if the prosecutor was 
ignorant of the existence of the favorable evidence? In United States v. 
~ ~ u r s , ~ ~  the Court framed the disclosure duty of the prosecutor as 
relating to evidence "known to the prosecution but unknown to the 
defense."88 Thus, "knowledge" by the prosecutor appears to be the 
touchstone of Bradyeg9 What are the extent and limits of a prosecutor's 
knowledge? A prosecutor's knowledge reasonably extends beyond 
her actual knowledge, for otherwise, the Brady rule could easily be 
nullified simply by keeping the trial prosecutor ignorant of 
information adverse to the government's case. Accordingly, a 
prosecutor is required to disclose not only evidence he actually knows 
about, but also evidence about which he "should have k n o ~ n . " ~  
A prosecutor is charged with knowledge of evidence held by 
government agencies investigating the case.9' However, a prosecutor 
usually is not charged with knowledge of evidence in the possession of 
government agencies that are neither investigative arms of the 
852,858 (5th Cir. 1979) (suppressing evidence for "prophylactic purposes"). 
85. See Leka, 257 F.3d at 91 (holding that delayed disclosure of a key eyewitness 
impaired ability of defense to effectively assimilate new evidence into existing trial strategy 
and violated Brady). 
86. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,84 (1963). 
87. 427 U.S. 97 (1976). 
88. Id. at 103. 
89. See Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 96 (1967) (White, J., concurring) ("[Alny 
allegation of suppression boils down to an assessment of what the State knows at trial in 
comparison to the knowledge held by the defense."). 
90. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103; see ako Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) 
("The prosecutor's office is an entity and as such it is the spokesman for the Government. 
A promise made by one attorney must be attributed, for these purposes, to the 
Government."). 
91. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437-38 (1995); Moore v. Gibson, 195 F.3d 1152, 
1164 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Bhutani, 175 F.3d 572,577 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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prosecutor nor participated in the investigation of the case.92 Nor is a 
prosecutor responsible for evidence possessed by investigative 
agencies of other jurisdictions, even though such agencies might be 
part of a joint-task-force investigating the same criminal activity.93 A 
prosecutor probably has an affirmative duty to acquire knowledge 
about relevant aspects of his case.94 For example, a prosecutor has an 
affirmative duty to review personnel files of law enforcement officials 
he intends to call as witnesses, particularly if the defense requests 
production of the files.95 A prosecutor also has an obligation to learn 
about the background, criminal record, and other relevant 
information of his key wi tne~ses .~~  
C. "Of Evidence" 
Brady did not explain the meaning of the term "evidence," 
particularly whether the suppressed evidence must be admissible as a 
precondition to establishing a due process violation. The Court agreed 
with the Maryland state court that the accomplice's undisclosed 
confession could not have affected the verdict of guilt because it was 
legally irrelevant to the jury's determinati~n.~' The Court also agreed 
92. See United States v. Beers, 189 F.3d 1297, 1304 (10th Cir. 1999) (refusing to 
charge federal prosecutors with the knowledge of materials in possession of a state police 
department). But see Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 43,57-58 (1987) (holding that a 
defendant, charged with raping his thirteen-year-old daughter, was entitled to have the file 
of a state agency that investigates cases of suspected child mistreatment reviewed by 
prosecutor, even though prosecutor had not seen the file, did not have access to it, and 
therefore did not comply with defense's request for its production). 
93. Moreno-Morales v. United States, 334 F.3d 140,146-47 (1st Cir. 2003). 
94. For discussions of the nature and scope of a prosecutor's duty to  seek out 
evidence favorable to a defendant, see Mark D. Villaverde, Note, Structuring the 
Prosecutor's Duty to Search the Intelligence Community for Brady Material, 88 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1471,1529 (2003) (suggesting an affirmative duty on a prosecutor to search files of 
government entities in terrorism cases for exculpatory evidence exists only if those entities 
have acted in a law enforcement capacity under the prosecutor's direction and control); see 
also Stanley Z .  Fisher, The Prosecutor's Ethical Duty to Seek Exculpatory Evidence in 
Police Hands: Lessons From England, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1379, 1424-27 (2000) 
(proposing amendments to the codes of ethics that would require prosecutors to more 
aggressively search for exculpatory evidence in police hands); Robert Hochman, Brady v. 
Maryland and the Search for Truth in Criminal Trials, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1673,1676 (1996) 
(suggesting that Brady imposes duties not only on prosecutors but on all state actors 
involved in the investigation and prosecution). 
95. See United States v. Alvarez, 86 F.3d 901,905 (9th Cir. 1996). 
96. Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463,479-80 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that a prosecutor 
has a duty to learn of the criminal record of a star witness known to be a career criminal, 
including prison records on file with correction agencies). 
97. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 90 (1963). The Court assumed that if the 
suppressed confession had been used at the first trial, the judge's ruling that it was 
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with the Maryland state court that the accomplice's confession would 
have been relevant at the sentencing stage because it could have 
influenced the jury to mitigate Brady's p~nishment.~' The Supreme 
Court, since Brady, has suggested that the admissibility of suppressed 
evidence may be a factor in determining whether a prosecutor 
engaged in an unconstitutional nondiscl~sure.~~ Indeed, in Wood v. 
Bartholomew, the Supreme Court intimated that admissibility of the 
evidence is a precondition to triggering the prosecutor's disclosure 
duty.lw In Wood, a polygraph test showing that a key government 
witness had lied would not have been admissible at trial and, 
therefore, did not constitute Brady evidence requiring dis~losure.~~'  
Several courts have construed the Brady rule to require that, unless 
the evidence would be admissible, it need not be disclosed.102 Other 
courts, by contrast, have drawn the opposite conclusion and rejected 
admissibility as a precondition for determining the applicability of 
Brady as long as the information could reasonably have led to 
admissible evidence.'03 Nevertheless, courts may be unwilling to 
speculate on the capacity of undisclosed and inadmissible evidence to 
irrelevant to guilt and therefore not admissible "might have been flouted." Id. The Court, 
however, was unwilling to raise this "sporting theory of justice" to the dignity of a 
constitutional right. Id. 
98. See id. at 88-89. 
99. See Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 73-74 (1967) (stating that information 
contained in suppressed police report might have been "admissible and useful"); see also 
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 100 n.3 (1976) (citing United States v. Burks, 470 F.2d 
432, 434-35 (D.C. Cir. 1972)) (stating that undisclosed proof of a victim's prior criminal 
record would have been admissible on the issue of self-defense). 
100. 516 U.S. 1 , 8  (1995). 
101. Id. at 6 (stating the result of a polygraph is inadmissible; it "is not 'evidence' at 
all" and it is "mere speculation" whether it could have been used effectively for any 
purpose). 
102. See Madsen v. Dormire, 137 F.3d 602,604 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Derr, 
990 F.2d 1330, 1335-36 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Zeigler v. Callahan, 659 F.2d 254, 269 (1st Cir. 
1981). 
103. See Ellsworth v. Warden, 333 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2003) (stating the hearsay 
statement of the victim may have led to discovery of a witnesses to  corroborate 
information contained in the statement); Paradis v. Arave, 240 F.3d 1169,1176-77 (9th Cir. 
2001) (finding the prosecutor's notes, although not admissible, could have been used to 
contradict a key medical witness and therefore nondisclosure was a Brady violation); 
Williamson v. Moore, 221 F.3d 1177, 1183 (11th Cir. 2000) (concluding that inadmissible 
witness statements could not have led defense to discovery of admissible impeachment or 
exculpatory evidence); see also Gregory S. Seador, Note, A Search for the Truth or a Game 
of Strategy? The Circuit Split Over the Prosecution's Obligation to Disclose Inadmissible 
Exculpatory Information to the Accused, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 139, 143 (2001) 
(advocating requiring a prosecutor to disclose inadmissible exculpatory information to the 
court, which would then decide whether the information may lead the defense to the 
discovery of admissible evidence). 
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produce admissible evidence and therefore strictly require that 
evidence be admi~sible.'"~ 
Brady did not distinguish between evidence that might directly 
exculpate a defendant and evidence that might undercut the 
prosecution's case by impeaching the credibility of a government 
witness. In Brady, the accomplice's undisclosed admissionlo5 was 
potentially exculpatory to Brady because it would have been helpful 
in showing that the accomplice, not Brady, was the actual killer. 
Current Supreme Court doctrine, however, makes no distinction 
between exculpatory and impeaching evidence.lM Exculpatory 
evidence exonerates a defendant; it relates directly or circumstantially 
to a substantive issue in the case. Typical examples of exculpatory 
evidence include a homicide victim's prior criminal record that 
circumstantially proves self-defense,'07 an eyewitness's prior mistaken 
identifi~ation,"'~ and a ballistics report showing that a weapon found 
on the defendant was not the murder weapon.'" Impeaching evidence, 
by contrast, typically would demonstrate that a witness is lying about 
facts in the case, or is generally unworthy of belief."' Examples of 
impeaching evidence include a promise of leniency made to a 
government witness in exchange for his testimony,"' a witness's prior 
false testimony suggesting a character for untruthf~lness,"~ and a 
witness's prior inconsistent statements relating to the facts of the 
case.'13 Alternatively, examples of general impeaching evidence 
include a witness's prior criminal record,ll4 a psychological report on a 
witness's c~mpetency,"~ and promises of leniency or rewards in prior 
 case^."^ In addition, the extraordinary lengths to which a prosecutor 
goes to curry favor with a witness may also be used to reveal an 
-- -- -- 
104. Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695,703 (11th Cir. 1999) ("A court cannot speculate 
as to what evidence the defense might have found if the information had been disclosed."). 
105. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,84,88 (1963). 
106. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,676 (1985). 
107. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,100 (1976). 
108. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,44145 (1995). 
109. Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842,845 (4th Cir. 1964). 
110. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) ("The jury's estimate of the 
truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or 
innocence . . . ."). 
111. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150,152-54 (1972). 
112. United States v. Cuffie, 80 F.3d 514,517 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
113. Spicer v. Roxbury Corr. Inst., 194 F.3d 547,556 (4th Cir. 1999). 
114. Perkins v. Le Fevre, 691 F.2d 616,619 (2d Cir. 1982). 
115. State v. Hunt, 615 N.W.2d 294,300-01 (Minn. 2000). 
116. United States v. Masri, 547 F.2d 932, 937 (5th Cir. 1977). 
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impeaching bias.l17 
D. "Favorable to an Accused" 
Under Brady, a prosecutor is obligated to disclose evidence that 
is "favorable" to the defendant."' Although Brady did not define the 
meaning of favorable evidence, both the Maryland appeals court and 
the Supreme Court agreed that the extra-judicial statement of the 
accomplice, by identifying himself as the actual killer, would have 
been favorable to Brady at ~entencing."~ Courts have understood 
Brady to require a prosecutor to divulge all evidence that could 
reasonably be considered favorable--or "helpful 9,120- to a defendant, 
meaning evidence that has some relevance to an issue in the case and 
could reasonably assist a defendant in preparing and presenting his 
case.'" Examples of favorable evidence are forensic reports that 
discredit key prosecution the~ries,'~' a memorandum from the Drug 
Enforcement Agency undermining the government's principal 
witness's integrity,'= polygraph reports casting doubt on the veracity 
of a key prosecution witness,lZ4 and a physician's report of an 
examination of an alleged rape victim disclosing no evidence of sexual 
interc~urse. '~~ 
Some courts have given the concept of favorable evidence a much 
more limited interpretation. For example, undisclosed evidence that 
an accomplice was actually an undercover agent for the government 
was held not favorable;lZ6 and undisclosed evidence that a key 
prosecution witness had recently died also was held not to be 
favorable to the accused.127 According to this restrictive view, only 
when there is a ccsubstantial basis" for claiming that evidence is 
117. See United States v. Burnside, 824 F. Supp. 1215,1265-66 (N.D. 111.1993). 
118. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,87 (1963). 
119. Id. at 8 M 9 .  
120. See Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66,10142 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring). 
121. See Daniel J. Capra, Access to Exculpatory Evidence: Avoiding the Agurs 
Problems of Prosecutorial Discretion and Retrospective Review, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 391, 
394-95 (1984) (noting that since a prosecutor is "an understandably biased party," it is a 
"nearly impossible task" for a prosecutor to determine objectively what evidence is 
favorable to a defendant). 
122. People v. Pilotti, 511 N.Y.S.2d 248,253 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). 
123. United States v. Brumel-Alvarez, 991 F.2d 1452,1458 (9th Cir. 1992). 
124. Carter v. Rafferty, 621 F. Supp. 533,548 (D.N.J. 1985). 
125. United States v. Poole, 379 F.2d 645,647-48 (7th Cu. 1967). 
126. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559-60 (1977); People v. Jenkins, 360 
N.E.2d 1288,1289-90 (N.Y. 1977). 
127. People v. Jones, 375 N.E.2d 41,42 (N.Y. 1978). 
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favorable must the evidence be dis~losed.'~~ Moreover, courts 
generally accord the prosecutor broad discretion in deciding whether 
evidence is favorable under Brady.lZ9 
Courts often find that evidence that is not clearly favorable need 
not be disclosed. For example, a ballistics report that no latent prints 
of value could be found on a murder weapon was held to be neutral 
evidence and not required to be discl~sed. '~~ Evidence that an 
eyewitness could not state whether the defendant was one of the 
masked perpetrators was also neutral and not required to be 
disc10sed.l~~ A prosecutor's failure to disclose the names of witnesses 
who saw nothing was "empty" rather than exculpatory evidence.'" 
Nevertheless, some "neutral" evidence may be so manifestly favorable 
that it must be disclosed. For example, scientific tests that fail to 
connect a defendant with items of clothing allegedly worn by the 
murderer are favorable evidence in that they point to a number of 
factors that could have linked the defendant to the crime and did 
not.133 
E. "Upon Request" 
One of the elements of the holding in Brady was the need for a 
focused request by the defense for favorable evidence.'" The 
importance of such a request was underscored in subsequent Supreme 
Court  decision^.'^^ In United States v. A g ~ r s , ' ~ ~  the Supreme Court 
established a two-tiered framework for determining the materiality of 
undisclosed evidence which depended on whether the defendant 
made a specific request for evidence, simply made a general request 
for "all Brady material," or made no request at a11.13' As Agurs 
cautioned, the prosecutor's failure to respond to a specific and 
128. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,106 (1976); People v. Consolazio, 354 N.E.2d 
801,80445 (N.Y. 1976). 
129. See People v. Fein, 219 N.E.2d 274,280 (N.Y. 1966). 
130. People v. Penland, 381 N.E.2d 840,843 (111. App. Ct. 1978). 
131. United States v. Rhodes, 569 F.2d 384,387-88 (5th Cir. 1978). 
132. Commonwealth v. Satterfield, 364 N.E.2d 1260,1263-64 (Mass. 1977). 
133. Patler v. Slayton, 503 F.2d 472,478-79 (4th Cir. 1974). 
134. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963); see United States v. Oxman, 740 
F.2d 1298, 1308 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating the Court introduced the request requirement "for 
no reason discernible in the opinion"), vacated sub nom. United States v. Plfaumer, 473 
U.S. 922 (1985) (mem.). 
135. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 
786,794-95 (1972). 
136. 427 U.S. at 97. 
137. See id. at 104-06. 
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relevant request "is seldom, if ever, excusable."'38 Thus, the Court 
imposed on a defendant who made a "specific request" for evidence 
an easier burden to establish prejudice.'39 Under Agurs, suppressed 
evidence that was specifically requested was material if it "might have 
affected the outcome of the trial";14" whereas suppressed evidence that 
was not specifically requested was material only if it "create[d] a 
reasonable doubt that did not otherwise e~ist."'~' The rationale for this 
dual standard appears to be that, by failing to acknowledge a specific 
request, the prosecutor engages in active deception by misleading the 
defense into abandoning potential trial ~trategies. '~~ 
The distinction between specific requests, general requests, and 
no requests produced considerable confusion and uncertainty in the 
lower courts, and was eliminated by the Supreme Court in United 
States v. Bagley, which established a unitary standard of materiality 
138. Id. at 106 ("[Ilf the subject matter of such a request is material, or  indeed if a 
substantial basis for claiming materiality exists, it is reasonable to require the prosecutor to  
respond either by furnishing the information or by submitting the problem to the trial 
judge."). 
139. See id. 
140. Id. at 104. 
141. Id. at 112. The Court observed that the proper standard for suppressed evidence 
that was unrequested "must reflect our overriding concern with the justice of the finding of 
guilt." Id. The Court also observed that in order to satisfy his due process duty under 
Brady, a prosecutor must make an accurate prediction about the significance of an item of 
evidence under a standard that is "inevitably imprecise." Id. at  108. The Court noted that 
under a "sporting theory of justice," which Brady expressly rejected, a prosecutor might be 
required to disclose his entire file as a matter of routine practice since any item of evidence 
might conceivably be relevant on the issue of guilt. Id. However, the Court cautioned that 
"the prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure." Id. For a 
discussion of the complex moral and legal judgments attending the prosecutor's exercise of 
discretion generally, see Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J .  LEGAL 
ETHICS 259 (2001). 
142. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 683 (1985) (There is a "significant 
likelihood that the prosecutor's response to respondent's discovery motion misleadingly 
induced defense counsel to believe that [the two government witnesses] could not be 
impeached."); see also People v. Vilardi, 555 N.E.2d 915, 920 (N.Y. 1990) (invoking the 
state constitution to impose a higher standard on prosecutors in cases where a defendant 
makes a specific request, because suppression "is more serious in the face of a specific 
request in its potential to undermine the fairness of the trial"); Barbara Allen Babcock, 
Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. 
L. REV. 1133,1149-50 (1982) ("First, a prosecutor's failure to respond to a specific request 
has the feel of misdealing. Second, the failure may lead the defense to believe such 
evidence does not exist.") (footnote omitted); Paul G. Nofer, Note, Specific Requests and 
the Prosecutorial Duty to Disclose Evidence: The Impact of United States v. Bagley, 1986 
DUKE L.J. 892, 892 (1986) (Agurs imposed a lesser burden on the defendant to establish 
materiality in the specific request context because such conduct by the prosecutor "is 
fundamentally unfair and amounts to prosecutorial misdealing."). 
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for suppressed evidence.143 Bagley held that suppressed evidence is 
material if there exists a "reasonable probability that, had evidence 
been disclosed.. . the result of the proceeding would have been 
different."'4 Although this unitary test of materiality is the rule in 
federal courts, states may apply a more defendant-friendly test when a 
defendant makes a specific request for favorable evidence.14s 
Moreover, even in the federal courts, the specificity of a defense 
request may encourage the court to apply a lower threshold of 
materiality in deciding whether nondisclosure violates due process.'46 
F. "Material Either to Guilt or Punishment" 
Brady held that a prosecutor suppressed evidence in violation of 
due process when the evidence was material to guilt or punishment.14' 
Brady did not articulate a standard of materiality governing a 
prosecutor's nondisclosure of evidence. Indeed, Brady's use of the 
term "material" appears to have been employed in an evidentiary 
sense rather than as a standard of review.148 After employing different 
tests of materiality, depending on whether or not a defendant made a 
specific request for evidence, the Supreme Court in United States v. 
Bagley announced a unitary standard for federal courts in determining 
whether a prosecutor's nondisclosure of evidence violates due 
process.'" Suppressed evidence is material, the Court stated, only if it 
could be shown that there was a "reasonable probability that, had the 
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different."lS0 The burden of establishing a 
"reasonable probability'' of a different outcome rests on the 
defendant.'" Bagley's standard of materiality was refined in Kyles v. 
Whitley,1s2 where the Court stated: "The question is not whether the 
143. 473 U.S. at 682. 
144. Id. 
145. See Vilardi, 555 N.E.2d at 920 ("[S]uppression, or even negligent failure to 
disclose, is more serious in the face of a specific request in its potential to undermine the 
fairness of the trial, and ought to be given more weight than as simply one of a number of 
discretionary factors to be considered by a reviewing court."). 
146. See Johnson v. Gibson, 169 F.3d 1239,1254-55 (10th Cir. 1999) ("[A] request for 
specific information, as opposed to a general request for 'all Brady evidence,' can lower the 
threshold of materiality necessary to establish a violation."). 
147. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,87 (1963). 
148. United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132,141 (2d Cir. 2001). 
149. 473 U.S. at 682. 
150. Id. 
151. See id.; United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,106 (1979) (indicating that the burden 
is on the defendant). 
152. 514 U.S. 419,434 (1995). 
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defendant would more likely than not have received a different 
verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair 
trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of 
~onfidence."'~~ Kyles also determined that an assessment of the 
materiality of all the suppressed evidence should be considered 
collectively, and not item by item.'" Consistent with Brady, the Court 
noted that the prosecutor's bad faith in deliberately suppressing 
evidence ordinarily is not relevant to a determination of materiality.'55 
G. "Irrespective of the Good Faith or Bad Faith of the Prosecution" 
Brady did not explain the inclusion of language in its holding that 
made a prosecutor's moral culpability in suppressing favorable 
evidence irrelevant for purposes of determining whether a defendant 
had suffered sufficient prejudice to require a new trial."6 The Court 
did note, though, that the critical consideration in reviewing a 
prosecutor's nondisclosure was the "avoidance of an unfair 
and not the "punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor."'58 
The Court amplified this point in United States v. ~ g u r s , ' ~ ~  noting that 
a prosecutor who in good faith has overlooked evidence that is highly 
probative of innocence will be presumed to have recognized its 
significance and will have violated his constitutional obligation.'@' By 
the same token, as Agurs observed, no purpose would be served by 
requiring a new trial when a prosecutor willfully believed he was 
suppressing highly significant evidence, if, in fact, the evidence had no 
probative value to the defense.16' As the Court observed in Agurs: "If 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 436. 
155. Id. at 437-38; see also Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110 ("Nor do we believe the 
constitutional obligation is measured by the moral culpability, or the willfulness, of the 
prosecutor."). Nevertheless, the Court admonished prosecutors to be "prudent" and err on 
the side of disclosure. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 439 ("[A] prosecutor anxious about tacking 
too close to the wind will disclose a favorable piece of evidence."); Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108 
("[Tlhe prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure."). 
156. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,87 (1963). 
157. Id. 
158. Id. Bur see United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 1968) (suggesting 
that the standard of materiality should be lowered when prosecutors engage in deliberate 
withholding of exculpatory evidence in order to "deter conduct undermining the integrity 
of the judicial system"). 
159. 427 U.S. at 110. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. The Court did not discuss whether requiring a new trial for deliberate and 
serious Brady violations might serve as a deterrent to future misconduct. See, e.g., United 
States v. Dollar, 25 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1332 (N.D. Ala. 1998) (dismissing charges with 
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the suppression of evidence results in constitutional error, it is because 
of the character of the evidence, not the character of the 
111. DISSOLUTION OF THE "BRADY RULE" 
The promise of Brady v. Maryland was to make the adversary 
system-and particularly the criminal trial-less like a sporting event 
and more like a search for the truth.IK3 However, as the Supreme 
Court began to develop and refine the so-called Brady rule, it became 
increasingly clear that the protections afforded by Brady for those 
persons accused of crimes were largely illusory. Moreover, for 
prosecutors, whose natural instincts are to discount any rule that 
would require them to assist a defendant in defeating the prosecutor's 
case, the Brady rule became an obstacle to be avoided or subverted. 
Finally, the absence of any meaningful disciplinary sanctions against 
those prosecutors who violated the Brady rule rendered the rule 
virtually unenforceable as an ethical matter. 
A. Erosion of Brady by the Judiciary 
Brady v. Maryland presaged a revolution in criminal justice. No 
longer could a prosecutor hide the truth and require the defendant to 
seek it The prosecutor was characterized by Brady as the 
"architect" of the trial, and assigned the constitutional duty of 
ensuring that the legal edifice of the trial was constructed solidly, with 
due regard for the safety of the defendant.165 Before Brady, the 
architecture of the trial may have been aesthetically pleasing, but in 
many ways was functionally suspect. Under Brady, the traditional 
adversarial structure would be replaced by a modified design in which 
the prosecutor's success would be measured not merely in terms of 
prejudice as a sanction for conduct by a prosecutor that "has trampled on [defendants'] 
constitutional right to Brady materials"); see also United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 1298, 
1304 (11th Cir. 1998) (imposing sanctions against a prosecutor for purposes of deterring 
future misconduct). 
162. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110. 
163. See William J .  Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest 
for Truth? A Progress Report, 68 WASH U .  L.Q. 1 , 8  (1990) ("[Tlhe Supreme Court began 
the modern development of constitutional disclosure requirements with our decision in 
Brady v. Maryland. . . ."). 
164. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668,696 (2004) ("A rule thus declaring 'prosecutor 
may hide, defendant must seek,' is not tenable in a system constitutionally bound to accord 
defendants due process."). 
165. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,88 (1963). 
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winning the competition, but winning fairly.'66 
Despite its grand promise of transforming criminal discovery, 
Brady received a somewhat deviant reception. In three early post- 
Brady cases-Miller v. Giles v. Maryl~nd, '~~  and Moore v. 
~ l l i n o i s ' ~ ~ - ~ r a d ~  was either ignored, discounted, or completely 
marginalized. In Miller v. Pate, an appeal from a conviction for the 
brutal sexual attack and murder of an eight-year-old girl, the Supreme 
Court condemned as a violation of due process both that the 
prosecution "deliberately misrepresented" to the jury that the stains 
on a pair of shorts worn by the defendant contained the victim's 
blood, and the deliberate suppression of evidence conclusively 
proving that the stains were not the victim's blood, but rather paint.'70 
However, the Court cited as the basis for its reversal the same false 
evidence cases that the Court used to support its Brady decision."l 
Brady was neither discussed nor cited. 
In Giles v. Maryland, decided the same Term as Miller v. Pate, 
the Court vacated a rape conviction, finding that the prosecutor 
suppressed prior statements of the State's two key witnesses that 
could have substantially impaired their ~redibi1ity.l~~ The plurality 
cited Napue v. Zllinoi~,'~~ one of the precedents supporting Brady, as 
the sole basis for its de~isi0n.l~~ Interestingly, the plurality chose to 
bypass as "unnecessary" and "inappropriate" any reference to "broad 
questions whether the prosecution's constitutional duty to disclose 
extends to all evidence admissible and useful to the defense, and the 
degree of prejudice which must be shown to make necessary a new 
Brady was not mentioned in Justice White's lengthy 
concurring opinion."6 Justice Fortas's concurring opinion noted the 
similarity between a prosecutor's misrepresentation of evidence, as in 
Miller v. Pate, and the "deliberate withholding of important 
information.. . in the exclusive possession of the State."177 Justice 
166. Id. at 8748. 
167. 386 U.S. 1,6-7 (1967). 
168. 386 U.S. 66,74 (1967). 
169. 408 U.S. 786,798 (1972). 
170. Miller, 386 U.S. at 6. 
171. Id. at 7. For this "established principle," the Court cited Mooney v. Holohan, 294 
U.S. 103,10649 (1935); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264,269-72 (1959); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 
U.S. 213,215-16 (1942); and Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28,31-32 (1957) (per curiam). 
172. See 386 U.S. at 74,82. 
173. 360 U.S. 264 (1959). 
174. Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66,74 (1967). 
175. Id. at 73-74. 
176. Id. at 81-97 (White, J., concurring). 
177. Id. at 100-01 (Fortas, J., concurring). Fortas also stated, "I believe that deliberate 
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Fortas observed: "A criminal trial is not a game in which the State's 
function is to outwit and entrap its quarry. The State's pursuit is 
justice, not a victim."'78 The dissent, by contrast, expressly rejected 
Justice Fortas' claim that a prosecutor has an obligation under due 
process to disclose to defense counsel materially favorable evidence, 
suggesting the reference in Brady v. Maryland for this principle was 
dicta and "wholly advisory."179 
Five years later, in Moore v. Illinois, the Court squarely 
addressed for the first time Brady's application to a prosecutor who 
suppressed favorable evidence that might have exonerated a 
defendant."" Moore had the potential to establish Brady as a powerful 
judicial weapon to ensure that prosecutors behave fairly when they 
bring defendants to trial. Instead, the five-Justice majority accorded 
Brady a narrow, unusually restrictive interpretation. The majority 
discounted the strong exculpatory evidence that would have 
substantially assisted the defendant in proving his claims of alibi and 
misidentifi~ation,'~' overlooked the prosecutor's dereliction in 
deceiving the defense into believing it had received the prosecutor's 
entire file,'s2 and gratuitously suggested that a prosecutor had no 
constitutional duty to "make a complete and detailed accounting to 
the defense of all police investigatory work on a case."ls3 The four 
dissenting Justices saw the case quite differently. Analyzing the 
concealment and nondisclosure by the State are not to be distinguished in principle from 
misrepresentation." Id. at 99; see akio Babcock, supra note 142, at 1150 ("In terms of truth- 
seeking, there often is no difference between the jury's hearing perjury and its failing to 
hear significant favorable evidence."). 
178. Giles, 386 U.S. at 100. 
179. Id. at 117 n.9 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
180. 408 U.S. 786,787 (1972). 
181. Id. at 795-98. The prosecution represented to the court that it presented its entire 
file to defense counsel and that defense counsel made no further request for disclosure. Id. 
at 794. Despite this representation, the prosecutor withheld from defense counsel the 
following items: (1) a statement made by one of its key witnesses that would have revealed 
that the witness could not have met the defendant when he testified he met him; (2) a 
statement by a witness that the defendant was not the person who committed the crime; (3) 
a statement by an eyewitness that a photograph of the defendant did not resemble the 
perpetrator; (4) a statement by a key witness that gave a description of the perpetrator that 
was different than the defendant's appearance; and (5) a diagram of the scene of the 
murder by one of the eyewitnesses that contradicted another witness's description of the 
shooting. Id. at 791-93. 
182. See id. at 795. The prosecutor "guaranteed defense counsel and the court that he 
would supply defense counsel with statements made either to the police or  to the State's 
Attorney by witnesses who were called to testify at trial." Id. at 808 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). Based on this representation, defense counsel's motion for discovery was 
denied. Id. 
183. Id. at 795. 
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evidence of guilt and the exculpatory evidence that the prosecutor 
willfully suppressed, the dissent forcefully demonstrated that the 
concealed statements "were not merely material to the defense, they 
were absolutely ~ritical."'~ Moore's conclusion was inescapable: 
Brady's promise of civilizing criminal discovery by ensuring fair 
dealing from prosecutors was insubstantial and ephemeral.ls5 
That Moore was not an aberration was underscored four years 
later in the seminal case of United States v. ~ ~ u r s , " ~  which 
circumscribed Brady's potential to reform criminal discovery by a 
new, complex, and virtually unmanageable analytic framework. Agurs 
reviewed a murder conviction in the District of Columbia during 
which the prosecutor failed to disclose to the defense the victim's 
prior criminal record for violent assaults, evidence of which would 
have supported the defendant's claim of self-defense.lS7 The 
prosecution argued on appeal that it had no duty under Brady to 
disclose this evidence absent a specific request from the defense.lg8 
Recognizing the uncertainty in the lower courts concerning Brady's 
requirement that the defense make a specific request for favorable 
evidence, Agurs considered whether a prosecutor has any 
constitutional duty to "volunteer exculpatory matter to the defense" 
in the absence of a specific request, and if a prosecutor had such a 
duty, what standard to apply.la9 
Under Agurs, Brady applied to three distinct situations, and the 
Court articulated three different standards of materiality that 
reviewing courts should apply depending on the nature and 
184. Id. at 806 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
185. See BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 224-25 (1979) 
(giving an "inside the chambers" discussion of the vote in the Moore case). According to 
the authors, the original vote to uphold Moore's conviction was seven to two. Id. at 224. 
After Justice Harry Blackmun circulated his majority opinion, Justice Thurgood Marshall 
circulated his dissent, analyzing the evidence and suggesting that the conviction was a 
"miscarriage of justice." Id. Justice Lewis Powell and Justice Potter Stewart quickly 
switched their votes; Marshall needed one more vote to take away Blackmun's majority. 
Id. at 225. Marshall was sure he could persuade Justice William Brennan to provide the 
fifth vote, particularly because Brennan had announced the opinion in Brady Maryland. 
Id. Marshall went to talk to Brennan and "returned shaken." Id. Although Brennan 
understood that Marshall's position was correct, Brennan was trying to cultivate a good 
relationship with Blackmun and if Brennan switched his vote, "Blackmun would be 
personally offended." Id. Moreover, "if [Brennan] voted against Blackmun now, it might 
make it more difficult to reach him in the abortion cases or  even the obscenity cases." Id. 
"Brennan had his priorities. His priority in this case was Harry Blackmun." Id. 
186. 427 U.S. 97 (1976). 
187. Id. at 100-01. 
188. Id. at 101. 
189. Id. at 107. 
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seriousness of the prosecutor's dereliction.lW First, when a prosecutor 
knowingly uses perjured testimony, a court should apply a test that 
would be most protective of a defendant's right to due proce~s.'~' 
Second, when a prosecutor suppresses exculpatory evidence that has 
been specifically requested by the defense, a court should apply a test 
that would be somewhat less protective of a defendant's right to due 
process than in the case of false te~timony.'~' Third, when a prosecutor 
suppresses exculpatory evidence that has not been specifically 
requested by the defense, a court should apply a test that would 
provide even less protection to a defendant's due process right.Ig3 
The Court conceded that the tests are "inevitably impre~ise,"'~~ 
and observed, somewhat wistfully, that "the prudent prosecutor will 
resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure."1g5 Nevertheless, the 
Court emphasized, a prosecutor has no constitutional duty to disclose 
any evidence unless the evidence that was suppressed reaches a 
sufficiently high degree of prejudice to undermine the "justice of the 
finding of guilt."'% Agurs repeated the ceremonial language routinely 
used by the Court to describe a prosecutor's mission to serve justice: 
"[A prosecutor] is the 'servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is 
that guilt shall not escape or innocence ~uffer.'"'~ Nonetheless, to the 
extent that the Court applied the concept of "materiality" 
prospectively and emboldened prosecutors not to provide "open file" 
dis~overy, '~~ the decision, as a practical, matter tacitly encouraged 
prosecutors to conceal favorable evidence and effectively insulated 
prosecutors from accountability, even for gross and willful 
misconduct. 
Plainly, the Court's three tests of materiality were not only 
190. Id. at  103-12. 
191. Id. at 103 (stating a conviction must be reversed "if there is any reasonable 
likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury"). The 
Court pointed out that such conduct involved "a corruption of the truth-seeking function 
of the trial process." Id. at 104. 
192. Id. at 104 ("A fair analysis of the holding in Brady indicates that implicit in the 
requirement of materiality is a concern that the suppressed evidence might have affected 
the outcome of the trial."). 
193. See id, at 112 ("[Ilf the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not 
otherwise exist, constitutional error has been committed."). 
194. Id. at  108 ("[Tlhe significance of an item of evidence can seldom be predicted 
accurately until the entire record is complete . . . ."). 
195. Id. 
196. Id. at  112-13. 
197. Id. at 111 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78,88 (1935)). 
198. Id. at 109 ("If everything that might influence a jury must be disclosed, the only 
way a prosecutor could discharge his constitutional duty would be to allow complete 
discovery of his files as a matter of routine practice."). 
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imprecise, but were also speculative, backward-looking, and 
confusing. If the verdict appeared to a reviewing court to be based on 
sufficient evidence, the impact of a prosecutor's suppression of unused 
and untested evidence would not only be difficult to evaluate 
retrospectively, but in the context of a guilty verdict, most likely 
viewed as not material. Moreover, implicit in Agurs was the 
acknowledgement that a prosecutor had considerable leeway to 
suppress substantially favorable evidence as long as the prosecutor 
anticipated that the suppressed evidence, even if it were subsequently 
discovered, would not impair the justice of prosecuting a clearly guilty 
defendant for a clearly provable crime. Finally, by placing the burden 
of establishing the constitutional violation on the defendant, the Court 
reversed the well-settled rule that requires the beneficiary of a 
constitutional error-e., the prosecutor-to demonstrate the 
harmlessness of his violation." By shifting the burden, the Court 
afforded the prosecutor an added perverse incentive to conceal 
evidence. 200 
Whatever constitutional life remained in the so-called Brady rule 
after Agurs was substantially eradicated nine years later in United 
States v. ~ a ~ l e ~ , ~ ~ '  in which the Court established a new standard of 
materiality that in practice rendered suppression of favorable 
evidence by prosecutors a routine and rational act.z02 Charged with 
narcotics and firearms offenses, the defendant specifically requested 
from the prosecutor any evidence of deals, promises, or inducements 
made to government witnesses in exchange for their testimony.203 
Although the government had paid two key witnesses for their 
testimony, the prosecutor suppressed this information and the 
defendant was con~icted. '~ On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed the conviction finding that the prosecutor's failure 
to respond to the specific request violated Brady; and, using a 
harmless error analysis, determined that the error was not harmless 
199. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (requiring reversal unless a 
prosecutor proves the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). 
200. See State v. Laurie, 653 A.2d 549, 552 (N.H. 1995) (holding the federal standard 
"impose[s] too severe a burden" on criminal defendants, and that New Hampshire's 
Constitution shifts to the prosecutor the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt 
"that the undisclosed evidence would not have affected the verdict"). 
201. 473 U.S. 667 (1985). 
202. See Sundby, supra note 3, at 644 (suggesting that under current Brady doctrine, 
"an ethical prosecutor arguably should never be in the position of turning over Brady 
material prior to trial" (emphasis omitted)). 
203. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 669-70. 
204. Id. at 670-71. 
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beyond a reasonable doubt.205 The Ninth Circuit also concluded that 
the Brady violation impaired the defendant's right to confront the 
government witnesses, requiring automatic reversal.'" 
The Supreme Court reversed, but made two alterations to the 
Brady rule. First, not surprisingly, the Court agreed that the Brady 
rule encompassed both impeachment as well as exculpatory 
e v i d e n ~ e . ~  Of far greater significance, however, was the Court's 
reformulation of the Agurs standard of materiality used to determine 
whether a conviction violates due process.208 After reviewing the 
Agurs framework, the Court suggested that the Agurs standard had 
been reformulated in two prior cases-United States v. Valenzuela- 
Bernalm and Strickland v. ~ashin~ton~'~-and that the revised 
standard was "sufficiently flexible" to cover every case of a 
prosecutor's suppression of evidence, regardless of whether the 
defense made a specific req~est .~"  Under the new standard of 
materiality, "evidence is material only if there is a reasonable 
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different."'12 A reasonable 
probability, according to the Court, is "'a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome. ,,,213 Bagley, instead of 
preserving a standard of materiality that reflected the strong moral 
authority of Brady, adopted a standard that gave prosecutors far 
greater discretion to suppress favorable evidence without violating 
due process. 
The Court applied this new formulation in three subsequent 
decisions: Kyles v. ~ h i t l e y , ~ ' ~  Strickler v. Greene,'15and Banks v. 
~ r e t k e . ~ ' ~  Kyles and Banks reviewed capital murder convictions in 
which prosecutors engaged in flagrant misconduct, including eliciting 
false testimony, coaching witnesses to give false testimony, and 
205. Id. at 673-74. 
206. Id. at 674. 
207. Id. at 676 ("This Court has rejected any such distinction between impeachment 
evidence and exculpatory evidence."). 
208. See id. at 682. 
209. 458 U.S. 858,874 (1982). 
210. 466 U.S. 668,694 (1984). 
211. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 681-83 (The government suggested that a materiality standard 
more favorable to the defendant should be adopted in specific request cases, but the Court 
rejected this suggestion). 
212. Id. at 682. 
213. Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 
214. 514 U.S. 419,421-22 (1995). 
215. 527 U.S. 263,280 (1999). 
216. 540 U.S. 668,703 (2004). 
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suppressing important evidence that would have made a different 
result "reasonably probable."217 The Brady violations in Kyles and 
Banks were so flagrant and inexcusable that reversal was required 
even under the Court's new prosecutor-friendly standard of 
material it^.^'^ Strickler, a capital murder conviction, also involved the 
suppression of important evidence including several critical 
documents that, as the Court noted, would have seriously undermined 
the credibility of a key prosecution witness.219 However, given the 
ample other evidence of the defendant's guilt, there was no 
"reasonable probability" of a different r e s ~ l t . ~  
B. Subversion of Brady by Prosecutors 
The following sections describe how prosecutors have 
increasingly sought to avoid and subvert the requirements of Brady. 
Prosecutors "play the odds" that their suppressions will not be 
discovered or will be found not material, engage in tactics that thwart 
the ability of courts and defense counsel to discover Brady violations, 
and affirmatively conceal Brady violations by carefully coaching the 
testimony of witnesses. 
1. "Playing the Odds" 
Predictably, prosecutors under the current standard of materiality 
are permitted "to withhold with impunity large amounts of undeniably 
favorable evidence" in the rational belief that an appellate court 
reviewing the conviction will conclude that there is no "reasonable 
probability" that the evidence would have changed the result.221 To be 
sure, this rnindset exists not only with prosecutors who are trying to 
"outwit and entrap [their] quarry,"222 but also by ethical prosecutors 
who attempt to balance their obligation to seek a conviction and at 
217. Banks, 540 U.S. at 675-76 ("When police or prosecutors conceal significant 
exculpatory or impeaching material in the State's possession, it is ordinarily incumbent on 
the State to set the record straight."); Kyles, 514 U.S. at 421,441,454 ("'[F]airness' cannot 
be stretched to the point of calling this a fair trial."). 
218. Banks, 540 U.S. at 675-76; Kyles, 514 U.S. at 454. Indeed, from the evidence in 
the record, it is strongly arguable that both Kyles and Banks were innocent. See supra note 
18 for cases of wrongful convictions in which the prosecutor's suppression of exculpatory 
evidence contributed substantially to the conviction. 
219. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 265,282. See infro notes 226-27 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of prosecutors suppression of evidence which would have seriously undermined 
the credibility of a key prosecution witness. 
220. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 296. 
221. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,700 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
222. Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66,100 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring). 
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the same time fulfill their constitutional obligation under ~ r a d ~ . ~ ~ ~  
Needless to say, such a prosecutorial mindset corrupts the truth- 
finding process and is antithetical to core values in the administration 
of justice that command prosecutors to serve justice and treat 
defendants fairly.224 
The dissenters in Bagley predicted that under the new standard, 
prosecutors deciding whether or not to disclose favorable evidence to 
the defense would increasingly "play the odds" that their suppression 
of evidence, even if discovered, would be found by an appellate court 
reviewing the conviction to be not material.225 This prediction has been 
borne out in countless cases where prosecutors have suppressed 
important items of evidence and courts have permitted this conduct. 
Thus, prosecutors will likely play the odds when they possess 
exculpatory evidence that might be valuable to the defense- 
confident that the evidence of guilt will be viewed retrospectively by 
an appellate court to be sufficiently substantial so that the 
prosecutor's suppression does not create a "reasonable probability" 
that the verdict would be different. A good example is Strickler v. 
Greene,226 a capital murder trial in which a key prosecution eyewitness, 
Anne Stoltzfus, initially told the police that she had only "muddled 
memoriesyy about a kidnapping in a mall and could not identify the 
perpetrators, the victim, or the a~tomobile.~~' At trial, however, 
223. Randolph N. Jonakait, The Ethical Prosecutor's Misconduct, 23 CRIM. L. BULL. 
550,554,559,565 (1987) (articulating that prosecutor's "naturally assume[] that defendants 
are guilty," and it therefore "becomes easy for the prosecutor to overlook and ignore 
evidence that does not fit his conception of the proper outcome"). 
224. See Stanley Z .  Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual 
Framework, 15 AM. J .  CRIM. L. 197, 198 (1988). Ethical codes uniformly recognize a 
prosecutor's role as a "minister[] of justice." Id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L 
CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2004) (describing the prosecutor as a "minister of justice"); 
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY E C  7-13 (2004) (stating that a prosecutor must 
"seek justice"); ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3- 
1.2(c) (1992), reprinted in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, RULES & 
REGULATIONS 1135 (John S. Dzienkowski ed., West Group 2001) ("The duty of the 
prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict."). 
225. Bagley, 473 U.S. at  701 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[Tlhe standard invites a 
prosecutor, whose interests are conflicting, to gamble, to play the odds, and to take a 
chance that evidence will later turn out not to have been potentially dispositive."). 
226. 527 U.S. 263 (1999). 
227. Id. at 265,273-74. Stoltzfus first spoke to the police two weeks after the crime. Id. 
at 273. She told Detective Claytor that she could not identify the black female victim, nor 
the two white male perpetrators, but could identify the white female perpetrator. Id. 
Stolzfus told Detective Claytor that "I have a very vague memory that I'm not sure of," 
and that "I totally wrote this off as a trivial episode of college kids carrying on and 
proceeded with my own full-time college load. . . ." Id. at 274-75. 
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Stoltzfus gave astonishingly detailed testimony about the event.228 She 
gave a detailed description of all three  perpetrator^,"^ the victim,230 
and even remembered the license plate number of the van.231 Denying 
suggestions that she had learned these details from news reports, 
Stoltzfus answered, "I have an exceptionally good memory."232 
The process by which Stoltzfus' memory improved so remarkably 
was revealed in a series of documents prepared by the lead detective 
in the case, Detective Claytor, which were never disclosed to the 
defense.u3 These documents were based on interviews between 
Detective Claytor and Stolztfus in which her memory continued to 
expand over time because, she claimed, of "the associations that 
[Detective Claytor] helped [her] make."'" 
The Supreme Court concluded that, although the prosecutor 
suppressed several items of favorable evidence that would have 
severely impeached Stoltzfus, there was other ample evidence of 
Strickler's involvement.235 Therefore, the petitioner failed to 
228. Id. at 270-74. She testified about seeing the perpetrators in a music store, 
described their appearance and behavior in detail, thought they looked "rewed up" and 
"very impatient," remembered bumping into one of them, and "thought she felt something 
hard in the pocket of his coat." Id. at 270-71. She left the store, but again encountered the 
threesome, one of whom bumped into Stoltzfus and asked directions to the bus stop. Id. at 
271. Stoltzfus followed them and later saw the man "tearing out of the Mall entrance." Id. 
She saw the victim blowing her horn a long time, and the petitioner "started hitting her on 
the head"; Stolzfus became upset. Id. at 272. Stolzfus stated that "[tlhe driver looked 
'frozen' and mouthed an inaudible response." Id. Next, "Stolzfus started to  drive away and 
realized 'the only word that it could possibly be, was help."' Id. 
229. Id. at 270 n.5. Stolzfus testified that Strickler: 
[Wlore a grey T-shirt with a Harley Davidson insignia on it.. . . [Co-defendant] 
Henderson "had either a white or light colored shirt, probably a short sleeve knit 
shirt and his pants were neat. They weren't just old blue jeans. They may have 
been new blue jeans or it may have just been more dressy slacks of some sort." 
The woman "had blonde hair, it was kind of in a shaggy cut down the back. She 
had blue eyes, she had a real sweet smile, kind of a small mouth. Just a touch of 
freckles on her face." 
Id. (citations omitted). 
230. Id. at 271. She testified that this woman was "'beautiful,' 'well dressed and she 
was happy, she was singing. . . ."' Id. (alteration in original). 
231. Id, at 272 n.7. 
232. Id. at 272. Stolzfus testified that she had very close contact with the petitioner and 
"he made an emotional impression with me because of his behavior and I, he caught my 
attention and I paid attention." Id. at 272-73. 
233. Id. at 273-75,282. Of the eight documents either prepared by Claytor o r  received 
by him from Stolzfus, it is undisputed that at least five of those documents "were known to 
the Commonwealth but not disclosed to trial counsel." Id. at 282. The prosecutor claimed 
that three of these documents were in his open file, but defense counsel maintained 
otherwise. Id. at 275 n.11. 
234. Id. at 274. 
235. Id. at 290. 
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demonstrate a "reasonable probability that his conviction or sentence 
would have been different had [the Stoltzfus] materials been 
d is~ losed ."~~ Justice Souter, joined by Justice Kennedy, dissented, 
arguing that "the likely havoc that an informed cross-examiner could 
have wreaked upon Stoltzfus" would have been "sufficient to 
undermine confidence that the death recommendation would have 
been the 
Prosecutors also "play the odds" when they suppress favorable 
evidence in the rational belief that an appellate court will find the 
evidence to be "cumulative" of other evidence already presented. A 
good example is Barker v. ~ l e r n i n ~ , ' ~ ~  a robbery case, in which the 
prosecutor suppressed several items of evidence that, as the appellate 
court acknowledged, would have substantially discredited a key 
prosecution witness Raul Abundiz, a "jailhouse snitch," who testified 
that the defendant confessed to him that he committed the robbery.I3' 
The court appeared to go out of its way to minimize the materiality of 
the suppressed evidence, finding that "the cumulative impeachment 
evidence is unlikely to have been the difference between conviction 
and a~qu i t t a l . "~~  
In concluding that the suppressed evidence was not material, the 
court failed to accord sufficient weight to several key factors. First, 
this was the second trial; the first ended in a hung jury based on the 
victim's equivocal identification and the absence of any other 
corroborating evidence.241 Second, the court acknowledged that the 
suppressed evidence would not only have "highlighted Abundiz's 
dishonest nature,"242 but also have prevented the defense from 
demonstrating that the alleged conversation between Abundiz and the 
236. Id. at 296. 
237. Id. at  304 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
238. 423 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2005). The case attracted considerable media attention 
and came to be known as the "clown robber" case because the perpetrator wore makeup. 
Id. at 1089. 
239. Id. at 1090. 
240. Id. at  1100; see also John B. Mitchell, Evaluating Brady Error Using Narrative 
Theory: A Proposal for Reform, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 599, 621-27 (2005) (critically 
evaluating the evidence at the first trial from the standpoint of how defense counsel could 
have made effective use of the suppressed evidence). 
241. Barker, 423 F.3d at 1089-90. Indeed, the court found the victim's identification at 
the second trial to  be extremely flawed. Id. at 1100. The court acknowledged that her 
identification was "not airtight[,] [hler view was obstructed by the robber's makeup and, at 
times, by a handkerchief." Id. Her description to the police "became more precise after she 
talked with co-workers who knew and already distrusted [the defendant]." Id. Likewise, 
"she did not see any of his tattoos," yet stated "that his hands were covered with markings 
and makeup." Id. 
242. Id. at  1096. 
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defendant in which the defendant supposedly confessed never in fact 
could have occurred.243 Although acknowledging that the suppressed 
impeachment evidence casting doubt on whether Barker could have 
confessed to Abundiz "is qualitatively different than the evidence 
i n t r ~ d u c e d , " ~ ~  the court, nonetheless, concluded that, although the 
suppressed evidence prevented the defense from "telling this tale," it 
would merely invite the jury to speculate.245 The court ultimately 
concluded that although the victim's identification was weak and 
although the new corroborating witness's "proclivity for lying had 
already been firmly established,"246 "we remain confident in the 
verdict despite the potential damage the withheld evidence would 
have 
2. Sandbagging Tactics 
In addition to "playing the odds," prosecutors have engaged in 
various tactics that are intended to subvert the Brady rule. One of the 
most insidious tactics used by prosecutors is orchestrating a scheme 
whereby a prosecution witness testifies that he has made no deal with 
the prosecutor concerning his testimony. However, unbeknownst to 
the judge or jury, the prosecutor has in fact entered into an agreement 
with the witness's attorney to reward the witness for his testimony and 
extracted a promise from the witness's attorney that he would not tell 
his client about the agreement. The witness, therefore, would be able 
to testify that there was no deal in place without perjuring himself 
because he would not personally be informed of the arrangement. 
For example, in Hayes v. Brown, the prosecutor reached an 
agreement with the attorney for a key witness in a murder case to give 
that witness transactional immunity and dismiss other pending charges 
in exchange for his testimony.248 However, seeking to keep the 
promise away from the judge and jury, the prosecutor obtained a 
promise from the witness's attorney that he would not tell his client 
about the deal; and, in that way, the witness could honestly testify 
243. Id. at 1095 ("[Ilt takes little imagination to see how a competent attorney could 
have implied that such a deal [between Abundiz and the prosecution to testify against 
Barkerj existed. It takes even less imagination to see how evidence calling into question 
whether Barker and Abundiz talked on June 14 would have helped Barker impeach 
Abundiz."). 
244. Id. at 1097. 
245. Id. at 1099. 
246. Id. at 1096. 
247. Id. at 1100. 
248. 399 F.3d 972,977 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
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without perjuring himself because he would not be personally 
informed of the In response to defense counsel's inquiry 
whether there has been any negotiated settlement in return for the 
witness's testimony, the prosecutor responded in open court that 
"[tlhere has been absolutely no negotiations whatsoever in regard to 
his testimony," and that there were "absolutely no promises and no 
discussions in regard to any pending charges."250 
The prosecutor took the position on appeal that there was no due 
process violation because the witness did not commit perjury."' The 
Ninth Court of Appeals scathingly rejected this argument: "It is 
reprehensible for the State to seek refuge in the claim that a witness 
did not commit perjury, when the witness unknowingly presents false 
testimony at the behest of the Citing the line of Supreme 
Court decisions involving the prosecutor's presentation of false 
testimony or the failure to correct false testimony, the court roundly 
condemned the prosecutor's scheme as "covert subornation of 
perjury."253 
Some prosecutors seek to insulate their witnesses from attacks on 
their credibility through other nefarious schemes intended to subvert 
the Brady rule. In Silva v. Brown, for example, the prosecutor made a 
secret deal with the attorney for a key witness to forgo having the 
witness psychiatrically evaluated prior to his testimony.254 The 
attorney for the witness, an accomplice in a murder who had suffered 
severe brain damage years earlier, had planned to have his client 
psychiatrically evaluated after his arraignment because he was either 
unable to cooperate in his defense or was insane.25s Because the 
psychiatric evaluation would "'supply ammunition to the defense,"' 
the prosecutor struck a bargain with the witness's lawyer under which 
his client would not be examined and in return, the prosecutor would 
249. Id. 
250. Id. at 979-80. 
251. Id. at 980. 
252. Id. at 981. 
253. Id. at 978, 981. A s  the court observed: "The fact that the witness is not complicit 
in the falsehood is what gives the false testimony the ring of truth, and makes it all the 
more likely to affect the judgment of the jury." Id. at 981. For other cases involving this 
scheme, see Willhoite v. Vasquez, 921 F.2d 247, 252 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that due 
process is violated when there is a reasonable probability that if the inducement had been 
offered by the prosecutor to the defense, the result of the trial would have been different) 
and People v. Steadman, 623 N.E.2d 509,510,512 (N.Y. 1993) (holding that a prosecutor's 
failure to disclose an agreement in exchange for testimony which was not a harmless error 
results in a new trial). 
254. 416 F.3d 980,984 (9th Cir. 2005). 
255. Id. 
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dismiss the murder charges in exchange for his te~timony."~ 
The appellate court reversed the defendant's conviction, finding 
that the prosecutor's "unscrupulous decision to keep secret the deal 
he made to prevent an evaluation of the competence of the State's 
star witness" was material impeachment evidence under Brady.'" 
Knowing that the prosecutor made a deal to foreclose the witness's 
psychiatric evaluation would have had a powerful impact on the jury's 
assessment of the witness's testimony. Indeed, "the very fact that the 
[prosecutor] had sought to keep evidence of [the witness's] mental 
capacity away from the jury might have diminished the State's own 
credibility as a presenter of evidence."258 
3. Coaching Testimony 
Some prosecutors are motivated to engage in improper coaching 
of witnesses in order to prevent the revelation of materially favorable 
evidence that the prosecutor has withheld from the defense. Improper 
coaching, the "dark secret[]" of the U.S. adversary system? is 
typically used by lawyers in preparing witnesses for trial in order to 
eliminate discrepancies in testimony and avoid embarrassing details. 
But coaching is also used by prosecutors to insulate Brady violations 
from being discovered. Plainly, a prosecutor, who is willing to violate 
his constitutional and ethical duty to disclose favorable evidence, is 
also willing to shape his witnesses' testimony to conceal the violation. 
Indeed, in the two most recent decisions in which the Supreme Court 
vacated convictions based on the prosecutor's suppression of 
exculpatory evidence,260 the implication of witness-coaching was 
transparent. 
A good example of coaching a witness to hide the existence of 
suppressed evidence is Walker v. City of New York, in which the 
prosecutor almost certainly coached a cooperating witness to give 
256. Id. 
257. Id. at 991. The court also noted, "When prosecutors betray their solemn 
obligations and abuse the immense power they hold, the fairness of our entire system of 
justice is called into doubt and public confidence in it is undermined." Id. 
258. Id. at 988. 
259. John S. Applegate, Witness Preparation, 68 TEX. L. REV. 277, 279 (1989) 
("Witness preparation is treated as one of the dark secrets of the legal profession."). 
260. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 677, 685, 705 (2004) (stating the suppressed 
transcript of pretrial practice sessions shows how the prosecutor "intensively coached" and 
"closely rehearsed" the testimony of witnesses); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,443 & n.14, 
454 (1995) (finding a clear implication of witness coaching from suppressed evidence as 
well as fact that testimony at subsequent a trial was much more precise than at an earlier 
trial). 
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false testimony in order to conceal from the defense information that 
would have undermined the witness's ~redibilit~. '~' In Walker, the 
prosecutor debriefed and prepared for trial a cooperating witness in 
an investigation of the robbery of an armored truck and murder of the 
truck driver.262 At the initial proffer session, the witness identified two 
individuals as having participated in the crime.263 The prosecutor 
subsequently learned, however, that one of these alleged accomplices 
could not have committed the crime because he was in prison on the 
date of the robbery.2M Nevertheless, the prosecutor elicited testimony 
from the cooperator before the grand jury and at trial where he did 
not mention a second accomplice.265 Although the decision by the 
Court of Appeals condemned the prosecutor's failure to disclose the 
stark inconsistency in the witness's story, the court did not discuss the 
witness's failure to mention the existence of a second perpetrator.266 
However, the implication of coaching by the prosecutor is obvious. 
C. Marginalizing of Brady by Disciplinary Bodies 
Making prosecutors accountable for violations of Brady has not 
been a success.267 To be sure, bar associations and grievance 
committees have the power to discipline prosecutors for violations of 
ethical rules.268 However, most commentators agree that professional 
discipline of prosecutors is extremely rare.269 The absence of 
--  - -- - 
261. 974 F.2d 293,295,301 (2d Cir. 1992). 
262. Id. at 294-95. 
263. Id. 
264. Id. at 295. 
265. Id. 
266. See id. at 294,301. 
267. Prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from civil liability for suppressing 
exculpatory evidence. E.g., Lyles v. Sparks, 79 F.3d 372, 377 (4th Cir. 1996); Carter v. 
Burch, 34 F.3d 257,263 (4th Cir. 1994). 
268. See, e.g., Lyn M. Morton, Seeking the Elusive Remedy for Prosecutorial 
Misconduct: Suppression, Dismissal, or Discipline?, 7 GEO. J .  LEGAL ETHICS 1083, 1088- 
89 (1994). 
269. See DWYER ET AL., supra note 18, at 175 (stating that even when cases are 
reversed because of a prosecutor's misconduct, "nothing happens to the people who broke 
their oaths and the law in pursuit of a conviction"); Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics 
as Usual, 2003 U .  ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1596 (2003) (noting that existing rules of ethics fail to 
regulate large areas of prosecutors' professional conduct); Rosen, supra note 27, at 697-98 
(discussing the absence of ethical remedies against prosecutors); Joseph R. Weeks, No 
Wrong Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the Duty of Prosecutors to 
Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA. C I n  U. L. REV. 833, 898 (1997) (concluding 
that disciplinary processes are almost completely ineffective against prosecutors); 
Yaroshefsky, supra note 16, at 288 (arguing that prosecutors who intentionally suppress 
evidence "are rarely, if ever, disciplined"); Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline 
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significant discipline of prosecutors is particularly noteworthy in cases 
in which prosecutors intentionally suppress evidence that leads to a 
reversal of a defendant's conviction and a stinging rebuke by a court 
of the prosecutor's misconduct. Although one would realistically 
expect disciplinary agencies to proceed aggressively against such 
unscrupulous conduct, such is not the case. Moreover, of all the 
ethical rules relating to the conduct of a prosecutor, the ethical rule 
governing a prosecutor's suppression of evidence is the most explicit 
and easiest to enforce.270 However, even when faced with this "most 
dangerous misconduct," disciplinary bodies typically look the other 
way.n' 
There are a variety of reasons for the hands-off approach: the 
existence of internal controls by prosecutor's offices, the ability of 
courts to supervise prosecutorial excesses, the deference by bar 
associations to executive power, limited resources, and lack of 
expertise in criminal procedural issues.272 Although there may be some 
basis to credit each of these reasons, they do not explain the stark 
disparity between the numerous and often egregious violations by 
prosecutors, and the infrequency of discipline. 
of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 755, 778 (2001) (stating that "prosecutors are 
disciplined rarely," but "the traditional lamentations regarding the absence of bar 
discipline are somewhat overblown, but also contain a large measure of truth"). On the 
effectiveness of discipline by the U.S. Justice Department's Office of Professional 
Responsibility, see DAVID BURNHAM, ABOVE THE LAW: SECRET DEALS. POLITICAL 
FIXES AND OTHER MISADVENTURES OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 331 
(Scribner 1996) ("The systemic failure of this tiny, extremely passive unit to confront 
directly the misconduct of Justice Department officials must be considered one of the most 
serious lapses in the department's recent history."); see also United States v. Hasting, 461 
U.S. 499, 522 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Prior 
experience, for example, might have demonstrated the futility of relying on Department of 
Justice disciplinary proceedings."); Greg Rushford, Watching the Watchdog: Veteran Justice 
Department Ethics Oficer Faces Questions About His Own Actions, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 5, 
1990, at 1 (criticizing the effectiveness of the Office of Professional Responsibility). 
Occasionally an offending prosecutor is punished by disciplinary bodies. See In re Peasley, 
90 P.3d 764, 766-67, 781 (Ariz. 2004) (en banc) (discussing a county prosecutor disbarred 
for deliberately presenting a witness's false testimony in two death penalty trials); Jeffrey 
Toobin, Killer Instincts: Did a Famous Prosecutor Put the Wrong Man on Death Row, THE 
NEW YORKER, Jan. 17,2005, at 54 (discussing Mr. Peasley's conduct and disbarment). 
270. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
271. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 16, at 288 ("Despite this well documented and all too 
recurrent violation of professional responsibility, prosecutors who engage in such tactics 
are rarely, if ever, disciplined."); Armstrong & Possley, supra note 8, at 13. After studying 
381 murder convictions which were reversed because of prosecutorial suppression of 
evidence or subornation of perjury, authors found that not one of the prosecutors who 
broke the law in these most serious charges were ever convicted or disbarred and most of 
the time they were not even disciplined. Id. 
272. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 16, at 289-96. 
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For example, commentators have examined numerous instances 
of deliberate suppression of evidence by prosecutors discussed in 
many of these cases cited in this article.273 These studies have included 
statistical surveys and interviews with personnel in bar grievance 
agencies. As virtually every writer has concluded, few if any of these 
prosecutors have been disciplined, and indeed, very few prosecutors 
have even been investigated by disciplinary bodies. In fact, some of 
these disciplinary offices have reported that they are not aware of any 
proceeding ever being instituted against a prosecutor for suppression 
of evidence, notwithstanding the existence of appellate decisions 
criticizing prosecutors for their misconduct.274 
Of the many instances of egregious misconduct by prosecutors in 
suppressing exculpatory evidence, the most disturbing examples are 
those cases involving defendants who were falsely accused and 
convicted and later exonerated.275 One would naturally expect that a 
prosecutor who abetted the conviction of an innocent person by 
suppressing exculpatory evidence would be a prime candidate for 
severe disciplinary action. Such is not the case, as too many examples 
prove. For example, there is absolutely no question that the 
prosecutor in People v. Ramos deliberately withheld exculpatory 
evidence from the defense that resulted in the wrongful conviction 
and imprisonment for seven years of an innocent man.276 The appellate 
court reversed the defendant's conviction for numerous Brady 
violations, and excoriated the prosecutor for her misconduct.277 The 
disciplinary committee conducted an investigation after the reversal 
by the appellate court and closed its investigation without imposing 
discipline.278 Interestingly, during the discovery process in a civil rights 
action brought against the city, it was revealed that the same District 
Attorney's office had been cited seventy-two times from 1975-1996 
273. See sources cited supra note 269; see also Weinberg, supra note 10; Yaroshefsky, 
supra note 16,281-82. 
274. See Weeks, supra note 269, at 881 (noting several cases of prosecutorial 
misconduct in which disciplinary action was not even considered). 
275. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (collecting cases and suggesting these 
cases are merely a tiny fraction of the total number). 
276. People v. Ramos, 614 N.Y.S.2d 977,980 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). 
277. Id. at 984. The suppressed evidence included proof that the child's sexually 
provocative behavior explained the evidence relied on  by the prosecution to suggest the 
child was abused; statements from the victim exonerating the defendant or inconsistent 
with his guilt; and statements from several prosecution witnesses that would have severely 
discredited their testimony. Id. at 980-83. In addition, the prosecutor elicited testimony at 
trial that was calculated to reinforce the false or inconsistent testimony of her witnesses. Id. 
at 980-81. 
278. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 16, at 28&82. 
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for misconduct, including the reversal of eighteen cases for 
suppressing exculpatory evidence.279 
IV. CODIFYING BRADY 
Criminal discovery allows a defendant to acquire relevant 
information about the prosecution's case, thereby enhancing the 
truth-finding process and minimizing the danger that an innocent 
defendant will be wrongfully convicted. Given the prosecutor's 
domination of the criminal justice system, the prosecutor controls 
access to information relevant to a defendant's guilt and has the 
ability to withhold information that might prove a defendant's 
innocence.280 However, the defendant's ability to acquire relevant 
information under current discovery rules is extremely limited and, 
indeed, may resemble a game of "blindman's buff And 
compounding the restrictiveness of pretrial discovery rules in general 
is the defendant's inability to obtain exculpatory information due to 
the prosecutor's ability to manipulate and abuse the disclosure 
requirements under Brady and its p r ~ g e n y . ~ '  As one reflects on the 
development of the law of prosecutorial disclosure since Brady v. 
Maryland, it is increasingly obvious that there exists a close nexus 
between a defendant's limited discovery in criminal cases and the 
enhanced opportunities for prosecutorial suppression of evidence. 
Because the power to control evidence is the power to conceal it, 
broadening the discovery rules in criminal cases might insure greater 
compliance by prosecutors with their disclosure obligations under 
Brady v. Maryland. 
279. Id. at 281-82. 
280. See YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1205 (9th ed. 
1999) (describing the prosecutor's domination of the criminal justice system, including 
investigative manpower of police, investigative legal authority of grand jury and grand 
jury's subpoena power, early on scene arrival by police when evidence is fresh, and the 
natural inclination of witnesses to cooperate with police and refuse to cooperate with the 
defense). 
281. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677,682 (1958). It is ironic that 
civil litigation, where only money is involved, provides extensive pretrial discovery 
requirements for the parties, whereas in criminal litigation, where a defendant's liberty and 
even life are at issue, pretrial discovery is so restrictive. The argument for restricting 
discovery in criminal cases has been that a defendant armed with such information will 
take steps to bribe, frighten, or  harm witnesses. See State v. Tune, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (N.J. 
1953). 
282. See Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 309, 327 (2001) ("To the extent that a prosecutor has exclusive knowledge and 
control of such evidence, the prosecutor can obstruct the defendant's access to it and 
thereby impede the discovery of the truth."). 
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Discovery rules, in contrast to the ethics codes, do not define the 
nature and scope of a prosecutor's disclosure duty under Brady. For 
example, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, which governs 
discovery in criminal cases, contains modest requirements of 
prosecutorial disclosure, but does not require a prosecutor to divulge 
significant kinds of favorable information that might enhance a 
defendant's ability to prepare and present his case.283 Whereas most 
local court rules of criminal procedure do not impose obligations on 
prosecutors to comply with Brady, there have been a few exceptions. 
For example, as a result of pervasive violations of Brady by federal 
prosecutors in Massachusetts, the federal courts adopted Local Rule 
116.2 to ensure that prosecutors complied with Brady's disclosure 
requirements.% The local rule requires prosecutors to disclose, under 
a limited time frame, any information that could "cast doubt" on the 
defendant's guilt, the admissibility and credibility of evidence, and the 
degree of the defendant's culpability under the federal  guideline^.^^ 
The local rule also requires the prosecutor to inform all law 
enforcement agencies participating in the investigation of the local 
rule's discovery requirements, and to obtain any information subject 
to The Massachusetts Local Rule 1.3 further imposes 
sanctions for noncompliance, including 
Other federal courts have imposed similar disclosure 
requirements on prosecutors that exceed the due process requirement 
of Brady. Recognizing that Brady's materiality standard is virtually 
impossible to discern before trial,2B8 these courts have reasoned that 
283. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16. Under Rule 16, a prosecutor is required to disclose 
statements by the defendant, the defendant's prior criminal record, inspection and copying 
of documents and tangible items, and summaries of expert testimony. Id. Not required to 
be disclosed are identities of witnesses, statements by witnesses, rewards or  other 
incentives to witnesses, information relating to  bias, prejudice, mental competency, 
criminal records of witnesses, inconsistent or  contradictory examinations or scientific tests, 
or the failure of a witness to make a positive identification of the defendant. Id. 
284. See United States v. Mannarino, 850 F. Supp. 57, 59, 71 (D. Mass. 1994) (finding 
that prosecutors had consistently, for many years, shown an "obdurate indifference t o . .  . 
disclosure responsibilities," and had engaged in "sloppy," "negligen[t]," "lame," and 
"insensitiv[e]" conduct); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(a) (providing authority for district 
courts to adopt rules governing pretrial procedure as long as local rule does not conflict 
with federal law). 
285. See Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, Proposed Codification of Disclosure of Favorable 
Information Under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure I1 and 16,41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
93, 104-06 (2003) [hereinafter Proposed Codification] (describing the background for 
enactment of Massachusetts Local Rule 116.2 and its provisions). 
286. Id. at  106. 
287. Id. 
288. United States v. Sudikoff, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1198 (C.D. Cal. 1999); see also 
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"just because a prosecutor's failure to disclose evidence does not 
violate a defendant's due process rights does not mean that the failure 
to disclose is proper."289 Thus, in United States v. Acosta, the federal 
district court ordered prosecutors "to timely disclose before trial all 
evidence or information known that tends to negate the guilt of the 
accused or mitigate the offenses charged."'% This standard is similar to 
the ethical standard in that it requires timely pretrial disclosure 
without regard to the materiality of the e~idence.'~' 
In light of the development of local rules imposing automatic 
discovery obligations on prosecutors, it has been suggested that 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 be amended to incorporate 
these changes and make them applicable to all federal  prosecutor^.'^ 
The proposal would require that within fourteen days of a defendant's 
request, the prosecutor must disclose all favorable evidence known to 
him or any law enforcement officer who participated in the 
investigation or prosecution of the events underlying the crimes 
charged.293 Favorable evidence includes "all information in any form, 
whether or not admissible, that tends to: a) exculpate the defendant; 
b) adversely impact the credibility of government witnesses or 
evidence; c) mitigate the offense; or d) mitigate punishment."294 
Reflecting on the evolution of Brady v. Maryland, one is struck 
by the stark dissonance between the grand expectations of Brady, that 
the adversary system henceforth would be transformed from a 
"sporting contest" to a genuine search for truth, and the grim reality 
that criminal litigation continues to operate as a "trial by ambush." 
The development of the Brady rule by the judiciary depicts a gradual 
United States v. Acosta, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1233 (D. Nev. 2005) (recognizing that the 
"cumulative 'materiality' standard [is] extremely difficult if not impossible to discern 
before trial"). 
289. Acosta, 357 F.  Supp. 2d at 1239; see also Sudikoff, 36 F .  Supp. 2d at 1199 (noting 
that absence of prejudice to  a defendant does not condone a prosecutor's suppression). 
290. Acosta, 357 F .  Supp. 2d at 1231. The district court noted that "'favorable' 
evidence and the 'negate or mitigate' standards are essentially identical." Id. at 1234. 
291. Id. at 1233. The district court addressed the potential conflict between the pretrial 
disclosure requirement and the Jencks Act, which requires the government to produce 
statements of witnesses only after they have testified at trial. Id. at 1234-36. In the event of 
a conflict, the government may either produce the evidence or seek a protective order 
from the court. Id. at 1236. 
292. See Proposed Codification, supra note 284, at 95. 
293. Id. at 111. 
294. Id. 
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erosion of Brady: from a prospective obligation on prosecutors to 
make timely disclosure, to the defense of materially favorable 
evidence, to a retrospective review by an appellate court into whether 
the prosecutor's suppression was unduly prejudicial. The erosion of 
Brady has been accompanied by increasing prosecutorial 
gamesmanship in gambling that violations will not be discovered or, if 
discovered, will be allowed, and tactics that abet and hide violations. 
Finally, the absence of any legal or ethical sanctions to make 
prosecutors accountable for violations produces a system marked by 
willful abuse of law, cynicism, and the real possibility that innocent 
persons may be wrongfully convicted because of the prosecutor's 
misconduct. Indeed, more than any other rule of criminal procedure, 
the Brady rule has been the most fertile and widespread source of 
misconduct by prosecutors; and, more than any other rule of 
constitutional criminal procedure, has exposed the deficiencies in the 
truth-serving function of the criminal trial. 
One proposal that might improve the truth-finding process by 
reducing the incidence of Brady violations is to expand the discovery 
rules to require prosecutors to make timely disclosures to the defense 
of favorable information known to them or other law enforcement 
officials. Whereas Brady has been transposed into an explicit ethical 
requirement in the professional responsibility codes, there has been 
no parallel development in the procedural discovery codes. In 
response to flagrant misconduct by prosecutors, however, some courts 
have imposed strict pretrial disclosure requirements on prosecutors, 
and local court rules have been enacted to codify such requirements. 
Amending the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to impose strict 
and explicit disclosure requirements on prosecutors might be one way 
to restore the promise of Brady v. Maryland. 
Heinonline - -  47 S. Tex. L. Rev. 728 2005-2006 
